

THE WAR IN SPAIN

A WEEKLY SUMMARY

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THE BOMBERS AND THE PIRATES

IT is curious how the practice of war degenerates steadily with the march of science and the progress of civilization. Those of us who were soldiers in the World War thought that we had experienced the worst of which human nature is capable. But, with the advent of Fascism, the ethics of fighting have gone into another scale of values altogether—as this last month of the war in Spain has shown. Defeated at Teruel, distracted from an offensive planned over some months and, not knowing where to expect attack from an enemy that is growing stronger in morale and material, the rebel general Franco has fallen back upon what can be regarded only as the tactics of desperation. His attempted "Blockade" of the coast of Government Spain was proving so futile that Lloyd's lowered their War Risks Insurance rates by about one-half. His mixed assortment of *Condottiere*, Moors, Foreign Legionaries and what not, were fought to a standstill or kept under severe pressure. In one arm he had some superiority—aviation. Hence, one course was left: to use his aviation against the civil population in the Government area, in the hope that he might succeed in demoralising it and cause it to bring pressure upon the Government to surrender. There is nothing quite new about this, for Mr. George Bernard Shaw, commenting upon the Washington Conference of 1921, wrote in the *Nation* of November 26th of that year, under the title THE LIMITATION OF CHRIST, as follows:—"The next war, then, will not be an effort to defeat the opposing army, and thereby compel the defenceless civilians behind it to accept whatever terms may be imposed on them. It will be an effort to compel the civilian population to choose between direct destruction and the same acceptance, even though its army may be intact, well supplied, and covered with military glory." Our italics. The words of Shaw apply to the present position of Franco, with just this difference—that he has tried to defeat the Government army and failed, and is now trying to wear down the loyalist civil population. Those acquainted with the history of Spain, the powers of resistance of her people and that strange, almost mystical stoicism which pervades their character, could answer off-hand that such tactics must inevitably fail. But we have actual evidence to take the place of all such conjectures. Every newspaper correspondent in loyalist territory has told more or less the same story in regard to the dreadful bombardments of helpless civilians during this last month or so. Mr. Andrew Rice, Special Correspondent of the *Yorkshire Post*, wrote on January 31st: "One finds among the civilian population a curiously fatalistic attitude towards air-raids. Heavy bombs are liable to go straight through a house and, owing to a delay-action fuse, burst in the basement. There is, then, no assured safety wherever one may take shelter. Even the elaborate 'refugios' are not invariably immune from direct impact. So, in an hotel, I have had the curious experience of hearing the syrens screaming outside, and simultaneously watching the waiters in the dining-room going deftly about their business, while not a diner stirred from his seat. Only a bomb in their midst would have started a panic . . ." and he comments: "What useful purpose, then, do the raids serve? Twenty civilians are killed, fifty are maimed, a thousand are terrified for a few moments—but the great bulk of the population remains unmoved. So what's the point?"

Franco's air raids have had one effect, at least, apart from stiffening the resistance of the loyalists. They are leaving his supporters abroad so ashamed of his stupidity and brutality that

even the most impudent among them are finding it difficult to say much in his favour. Those air raids are having an effect directly the opposite of what the rebels expected of them. It is impossible to justify them on any count whatsoever—legal, moral or military. They have, perhaps, one favourable aspect, and it is that they have stirred the French Prime Minister and our own Foreign Secretary into an attempt to persuade both sides in the Spanish struggle to put an end altogether to the massacres of old men, women and children behind the line. The Spanish Government had already appealed to the rebels for a mutual cessation of the bombing of non-military objectives—but without success. Then the Ministry of Defence at Barcelona, on its own initiative on February 3rd, decided to abstain from all air raids of a general character and stopped the elaborate preparations that were being made to bomb Franco territory. One cannot but admire the dignity and self-restraint of such a decision in a moment of extreme provocation. Furthermore, it is a gesture which shows the Government's strength and confidence—just as Franco's refusal shows his weakness and desperation.

The other interesting feature of recent days is the return of the submarine pirates to the Mediterranean. The most interesting aspects of this piracy are the following unchallengeable facts: (1) Not one submarine remained in the possession of the Spanish rebels and (2) the Italian Government has given to the rebels recently four destroyers, and "assigned" two submarines to the rebel naval base at Soller in Majorca. These two submarines are now flying rebel flags! Could any act of intervention be more blatant than this? One of the first activities to be recorded after the transfer of these naval Italian units to the rebels was the torpedoing on February 1st in broad daylight of the British merchantman *Endymion*, while flying both the British and the Non-Intervention flags and with a neutral (Swedish) Non-Intervention officer on board. On February 4th, an even greater outrage was perpetrated, when the British ship *Alcira*, also flying our flag and that of the Non-Intervention Control, was bombed by two Italian sea-planes from the base which the Italians have established for the rebels at Palma, Majorca. In the first, 10 out of the crew of 14 lost their lives; in the second, the whole British crew were rescued by a Government sloop and a fishing boat and brought to Barcelona. "Without warning," one of the rescued men of the *Alcira* reported, "two aeroplanes approached, and immediately dropped three bombs from a height of only 100 feet, all of which hit the ship. Two sailors were burnt by explosions, and four others jumped into the sea to be picked up by lifeboats. The ship sank in five minutes." Twenty-one British ships were bombed or attacked up to October 21st, 1937, two others were sunk and one bombed and machine-gunned. Then came the Nyon Control, after which the pirates vanished. But, apparently, the French and British navies relaxed their vigilance—and back we were again where we started. Other ships have suffered—the Dutch vessel *Hannah*, torpedoed on January 11th, and the British ship *Lake of Geneva*, attacked by a submarine. The French response to these activities was immediate. Instructions were issued to the French Navy to sink all submerged submarines west of Bec l'Aigle (near Marseilles). How did Italy react to this and Britain's decision to increase vigilance? By saying that the *Endymion* incident was a fake! It will be remembered that, when the German and Italian bombers wiped out Guernica, the first reaction of Salamanca was to declare that no rebel planes had gone into the air that day!

Now—and then

Great Britain's relations with the *De Jure* Government of Spain, since the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936, have shown such divergence from traditional British policy that we believe it desirable to draw the attention of readers to what has happened in the past. Britain's policy was always directed to one end: the maintenance of the *complete independence of Spain*. Our statesmen have never hesitated to intervene in Spanish affairs the moment the independence of the Peninsula was threatened—except on the present occasion, when Great Britain permitted Italy and Germany to over-run and administer rebel territory. Furthermore, in the past, Britain took drastic action against rebel piracy, the bombardment of open towns, etc., and always favoured the elected Government against rebels—in accordance with international law. To-day the policy of "Non-Intervention" cuts across every precept of international law, and has severely handicapped the *De Jure* Spanish Government. Let us glance at what happened in the case of the First Spanish Republic of 1873. In June, 1873, the *Cortes* met and proclaimed a Federal Republic. The South, which wanted a cantonal republic on the Swiss model, revolted, and with it most of the Spanish fleet under the command of General Contreras. Rebels held Seville, Cartagena, where there was an important arsenal, and several of the southern ports, but were eventually defeated by the Madrid Government. The First Republic did not last long, and Monarchy was restored under Alfonso XII on December 29th, 1873. In the following correspondence, Great Britain's prompt action with regard to the rebels, particularly in connection with the bombardment of Almería and Málaga, is revealed in vivid contrast to British behaviour with regard to the rebels in Spain to-day. The revolt broke out at Cartagena on July 15th, 1873. On July 23rd, the Madrid Government issued a decree proclaiming that the rebel warships were pirates and should be treated as such, and so informed the British Government. On July 24th (i.e. the day immediately following), the British Foreign Office instructed the Admiralty: "... that Her Majesty's Government consider that if such vessels commit any acts of piracy affecting British subjects or British interests, they should be treated as pirates." On September 24th, 1873, the Foreign Office again instructed the Admiralty to this effect: "Her Majesty's Government would desire that British naval officers should be reminded ... that if an attack is made at sea upon any foreign vessel by a ship belonging to no recognised national Government who can be made responsible for such acts, such attack is piracy."

In the present Spanish Civil war, fourteen months had passed before Great Britain felt herself shamed into making a similar statement at Nyon; but even then it was much less decisive. On July 30th, 1873, the British Senior Naval Officer at Gibraltar telegraphed the Admiralty that the British consuls at Almería and Málaga had informed him that rebel frigates were preparing to bombard these ports: "... I sent *Lynx* immediately and retain *Pheasant* in case you want special orders about Málaga. Commander of *Lynx* will wait upon German Commodore on arrival to assist him in preventing bombardment of Málaga. ... I think presence of ships alone will stop bombardment." On August 3rd, Lord Granville (British Foreign Secretary) wrote to the British Minister in Berlin informing him that German and British warships off Cartagena had jointly "... seized and carried into Cartagena the revolted Spanish men-of-war, thereby saving Málaga from being bombarded and sacked." On August 1st, the British Consul at Málaga wrote to Lord Granville: "The inhabitants of Málaga congratulate themselves upon having escaped a dreadful disaster, for it is now evident that the object of the insurgents was to attack the town by sea with their ships and by land by means of their confederates ... and the plunder and loss of life would have been fearful to contemplate." Vice-Admiral Yelverton, in command of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean, telegraphed the Admiralty on August 2nd, 1873: "There is no doubt that, through the timely interference of the [German] Commodore and [British] Captain Ward, Málaga was saved from bombardment, bloodshed and sacking." The rebel commander, General Contreras, did, however, bombard Almería. The British Consul at Almería informed the British Consul at Málaga that he had immediately demanded an interview with Contreras, "... in order to prevent, if possible, the continuance of his criminal and barbarous proceeding against an open, inoffensive and peaceful town. ... I tried, in the name of the nation I represented, to dissuade him from firing any more." On July 31st, Commodore Werner [German] and Captain Ward signed a joint statement declaring that: "... having received reliable information that these [insurgent] vessels had bombarded the defenceless town of Almería ... they agree to force the Spanish vessels into a solemn declaration, which they will see carried out, that they retire and remain in the port of Cartagena until this action on their part is approved or reversed by their superior authorities,

otherwise Commodore Werner and Captain Ward will capture them and take them to Gibraltar pending ulterior decision."

Direct Action

It will be seen from the above that 65 years ago Great Britain was not afraid of direct action. International law to-day justifies such action no less than it did in 1873. In that year the Madrid Government requested Great Britain to surrender to it the rebel vessels which Captain Ward and Commodore Werner had captured. Great Britain agreed. On August 13th, the British Minister in Madrid wrote to Lord Granville that the Spanish Government was, "... most grateful to Her Majesty's Government for the prompt decision in this matter as it strengthened their hands in dealing with the insurgents. ... I took special care to convey to His Excellency that the mere act of seizure and restitution of the said vessels in no way implied intervention or interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government in the affairs of Spain." When the Spanish Admiral representing the Madrid Government asked for the return of the ships, Vice-Admiral Yelverton told him that he (the Spanish Admiral) had not enough force to prevent the rebels from recapturing the ships. "I suggested that, in order to avoid the difficulty with regard to non-intervention and neutrality, the ships should be sent to Gibraltar and there detained in British custody until ... the suppression of the insurrection. ... Their Lordships will perceive that my object is that the revolted ships may not, by any act of ours, again fall into the possession of the rebels"—Vice-Admiral Yelverton to the Admiralty Office, August 25th, 1873. Then we acted in accordance with international law and on the side of the legitimate Spanish Government. Now—hesitation and vacillation, while our shipping is bombed and torpedoed by rebel pirates, and our potential enemies obtain a stranglehold on every strategic point that can be used against us in the next European war.

The Church in Spain

Roman Catholics in Great Britain and elsewhere are divided in opinion in regard to the present Civil War in Spain, and we have therefore asked a Catholic to explain the position. He writes as follows: "Propagandists for Franco consistently seek to identify the rebel cause with that of the Catholic Church. The purpose of this manoeuvre is two-fold: primarily to give the appearance of *mass support* to the conspiracy of rebels, and secondly, to cloak under the guise of a 'Religious Crusade' their efforts to overthrow the Legitimate Government of the Republic. *No purely religious issues were or are involved in the war*, which is a politico-economic struggle. Nevertheless, General Franco found useful accomplices amongst the Spanish hierarchy. Their part in the struggle forced the religious question to the fore, not by transforming the rebel conspiracy into the hoped-for 'Crusade,' but by accentuating a rift within the ranks of the Spanish Catholic Church itself. The result is that, while the majority of the clergy and many of their followers have made a common cause with the rebel *junta*, several outstanding clerics, an influential section of the Catholic intelligentsia, several million Catholics and at least one of the great national Catholic political parties recognise the Republic as the only legitimate authority to which they owe civil allegiance. The cause of this Catholic division (in which no doctrinal questions are involved) can be found in the historical background of the Spanish Church itself. For over seven centuries Spain has been a Catholic country. Nominally, almost the entire population was Catholic—the latest census figures revealed only 35,000 Spanish dissenters. The Spanish Church was not involved in the Reformation struggles. Like most Spanish institutions, it preserved and carried forward intact into the nineteenth century its feudal structure and outlook. At the moment when the impact of rising European liberalism began to penetrate beyond the Pyrenees, and had begun to devise means for the disentanglement of land, the Spanish Church was Spain's largest landowner. Its title to its properties was as legitimate as that of any landlord, but their vast extent made the clergy the object of Liberal criticism and attack. Until the Church's hold on land could be removed, agrarian reform was an utter impossibility. Successive Governments confiscated and restored Church lands, until, under the terms of the Concordat of 1851, the Church surrendered the major portion of its holdings in return for an annual state subsidy of about £3,500,000. Thus allied to the State, the Church began to acquire the caste character of the army. While most of its clergy were drawn from the ranks of the people, the bishops, *nominees of the Government*, were drawn almost entirely from the aristocracy and lesser nobility. The result of this partnership was that the State was able to turn the Church into an instrument of the governing classes, while the Church itself strove hard to utilise State power for the maintenance of its influence and prestige throughout the country.

The clergy became accustomed to a Spanish people who were entirely Catholic. By concentrating more and more on material and political ends, they transformed the Church, in the eyes of many of its followers, into nothing more or less than an extra department of State, very slightly concerned with religious matters. And so, as the clerics entered the political arena to preserve their material position, they naturally allied themselves with other large landowners. *The more the clergy became politically active, the more their opponents became anti-clerical.*—and the more vehement became the official anathemas which the Bishops hurled at the heads of their critics. Essentially, neither the Church nor its opponents were religious or anti-religious. The conflict was a simple extension of the political and economic one.

Largest Vested Interest of all

"On the establishment of the Republic in 1931, the Catholic Church was the *largest single vested interest in Spain*. It claimed nominal allegiance from the vast majority of Spaniards. It was Spain's greatest (indirect) landlord. It was Spain's schoolmaster. It was banker, money-lender and industrialist. It had a finger in every pie, and it saw in the leaders of the new liberal-democratic Republic those men whom it had always denounced. The founders of the Republic well knew the opposition they would have to face. The Spanish clergy, a veritable army of occupation, numbered 106,734 persons! (25,474 priests and 81,260 monks and nuns). There was one priest for every 900 persons; one cleric for every 200. Economically the clergy were very strongly entrenched. Their resources were estimated at something between £200,000,000 and one-third of the total national wealth. As biggest single (controlling) landlord, the Spanish Church in 1931 controlled much slum property in the cities. It held a considerable interest in urban transport in the Underground Railway, 'buses and tramways, etc., both in Barcelona and Madrid. It owned the *Banco Espiritu Santo*—the Bank of the Holy Ghost—one of the most profitable of Spain's Big Five. It was the largest individual stockholder in telephones, lumber, contract engineering and electricity. It owned mines in Spain and in Morocco. It held controlling interest in *El Sigla* and *El Aguila* chain-stores. It had interests in film production, cinemas, theatres, cafés, hotels, sports grounds. It owned dog-racing tracks and bull-rings. Through holding companies it gathered a tithe from the profits of Madrid's most *risqué* cabarets. Other cabarets, including the notorious *Novo Mundo* in Saragossa, it controlled entirely. A profitable section of its business was based on charity— orphanages, for example, provided it with almost a monopoly in laundries. It administered an educational system which had left 46 per cent. of the population illiterate. Its schools, of low standard from a secular viewpoint, were still lower from the religious one: Spain's leading anti-clericals were all educated by the Jesuits.

Curbing Church Power

"The first *Cortes* quickly realised that the Republic, without land reform, education reform and political and military reform, could not exist. As the Church had resolutely set its face against any policy of co-operation, special measures were introduced to curb its excessive power. State-supported schools were secularised. Church and State were separated. Notice was given that within two years the annual subsidy would be cut off. The Jesuits were ordered to leave the country, their property to be nationalised and devoted to charitable and educational purposes. Churches were no longer to be immune from taxes. Fundamentally these were not anti-religious measures. Undeniably they were *anti-clerical*. They were heartily welcomed by many Catholics, who hoped that they would serve to shake the clergy out of their lethargy and create a revitalised Spanish Church, which would be closer to the people. The clergy were shaken out of their lethargy, but their activities turned towards *politics* rather than religion, and, while the anti-clerical measures of the Republic remained paper decrees, the clerics cemented an alliance with the extreme reactionaries, identifying the Church with the Quasi-Fascist violent party of Gil Robles. The Church claimed to speak in the name of the Spanish nation, which was predominantly Catholic. How deep was the gulf which separated the hierarchy from the faithful was shown in February, 1936, when the Spanish people, at the polls, *decisively defeated the clerico-political Acción Popular*. During the five months between the February election and the outbreak of the rebellion, the Popular Front adopted an especially conciliatory attitude towards the Church, hoping vainly to the last minute to secure clerical co-operation. In answer, the Church consistently blocked every effort made towards reform. In disregard of Canon Law and Papal Encyclicals, which enjoin support of a legitimately established Government, the majority of the hierarchy supported General Franco once the standard of open revolt was raised. In the name of 'Christianity' they made common cause with the atheist Queipo de Llano, the anti-

clerical *Falangists*, the Mahomedan Moors, and the anti-Catholic pagans of Hitler's Third Reich.


"There were, however, notable exceptions, mainly in the Basque country, where the local clergy had always disapproved of the political activities of their Castilian and other brethren in Spain, and maintained close ties with the Basque people and their aspirations for self-government. From behind the rebel lines, the Archbishop of Toledo, Cardinal Primate of Spain, issued a Pastoral Letter denouncing his Legitimate Government and declaring his adherence to the rebel cause. In loyal areas, meanwhile, where churches had been transformed into rebel strongholds, machine-gun nests and storing places for arms and ammunition, the incensed people attacked and in many cases destroyed them, before the Government, harassed by rebellion and plots, had time to interfere. In many towns unpopular or grasping clerics were openly assaulted, but in most cases Government troops protected them from their outraged flocks, providing them with safe-conducts abroad. To prevent further anti-clerical violence, the Government suspended the holding of public religious services, although later it gave permission for them to be held *in private* by approved priests. This measure was intended for the protection of the priests and Church property itself, and responsible Cabinet Ministers, themselves Catholics, made it clear that the churches would re-open for public worship as soon as general indignation with the clergy began to wane. In the Basque country, where both priests and bishops sided loyally with the people, there were no outbreaks of anti-clerical feeling. Until the Moorish troops of General Franco arrived there, religious services were conducted in a normal manner.

Hierarchy versus People

"Franco's rebel troops, cynically professing to represent a 'Religious Crusade,' executed over 150 priests who had remained loyal to the Government, and the hierarchy continued to issue a series of apologia for their part in the rebellion, which drew from loyal Catholic brethren the answer, '*Thank God, Your Eminences are not infallible,*' and caused Republican priests to announce that a Pastoral Letter on a political subject carries no ecclesiastical weight, beyond that accorded to individual opinion. A collective letter of support for General Franco was circulated among the hierarchy and through the exercise of spiritual pressure a number of signatures were acquired. Far more significant, in the circumstances however, are the absentees, the most notable of whom are Cardinal Vidal i Barraquer, Archbishop of Tarragona, and the Bishop of Vittoria. The effect of these letters abroad has been on the whole to rally official Catholic support for General Franco, but, nonetheless, large numbers of influential Catholics in every country are not convinced that the Spanish rebels and their allies are 'Crusaders for a Christian cause.' Much more impressive that the Bishop's Pastorals, they have found the loyalty of the Basque clergy, and that of such distinguished Spanish priests as Fr. Garcia Morales and Leocadio Lobo, who have become spokesmen for millions of loyal Spanish Catholics. The Vatican has awarded the Burgos *Junta* only support of a negative though sympathetic character. It is well aware that, as the London *Catholic Herald* wisely observed, '*The Church will gain nothing if it creeps back to Power under General Franco's bayonets; only a thorough spiritual cleansing and revival can save Catholicism in Spain.*' Far-sighted Catholics, loyal to the Spanish Government, believe that the Civil War may provide this cleansing. Confidently they look forward to the day when, as Catholics and citizens, they may claim their rights for having done their duty and helped to neutralise the harm done to their Church by the egoism and blindness of the effete hierarchy. As news percolates abroad of the atrocities and oppression in the rebel zone—of what that very distinguished Catholic writer Jacques Maritain calls 'The White Terror'—the doubt in the minds of all good Catholics increases. There is evidence to show that, in England, Catholic opinion is steadily veering towards the Government side—the more so since the recent massacres of civilians by Franco's alien bombers."

Education

Those who have read the literature hitherto produced by Franco's propagandists, or the accounts of journalists who have visited rebel territory, will have noticed one thing: there is rarely, if ever, any reference to any attempts of the rebel authorities to further education. The reasons are obvious to those who know. Education as a social service hardly exists there, and schools, institutes and even universities are closed down on the excuse that the teaching personnel is required for more urgent war purposes. In the Government territory nothing of that sort has happened. Under the Popular Front Government, the Budget Allocation for Education in 1937 is over 140 million pesetas, compared with 3 million in 1936,



9 million in 1935, 30 million in 1934, 43 million in 1933, 57 million in 1932 and 14 million in 1931. This was for elementary education alone. For the creation of new schools, the last Monarchist Budget allocated 1,247,000 pesetas—in 1930. In 1937 the harassed Republican Government allocated 40 million pesetas for the same purpose—and in time of war! The old idea of the reactionaries was to keep the Spanish people illiterate. The Republic wishes to see them literate. We have a pamphlet **EDUCATION IN REPUBLICAN SPAIN—A Brief Survey**, which is now available: 2d. by post 3d.

A Note on the above Map

We wish to draw attention to the above map, which is worth a little close study. Owing to the small space available for reproduction here, it should be used in connection with a larger map, showing the division of the country into provinces as well as the innumerable towns. But this map should help to bring out very forcibly the fact that the military rebellion was carefully planned: to have totalitarian *Portugal* as lines of communication for the rebel onslaught against Madrid, Andalusia, Catalonia and the North; to gain rapid access to the richest *mineral* areas; and to have *interior military lines* of communication. In some of these, as will be seen, the rebels succeeded. Their great advantage, due to the surprise of their movement, was to have *Portugal* behind them. *Portugal* was where the conspiracy was hatched, and Estoril and Lisbon were headquarters of the rebel "brain trust," where the Landowners, Church dignitaries, Financiers and Generals met, and from which the movement was launched. Oporto (Leixões) and Lisbon were the ports where German material was landed and stored *beforehand*. The connecting railways go from Lisbon and Oporto to the rebel "life line" from Cadiz to Burgos, to Salamanca and León for Galicia. The importance of these railways is self-evident. Strategically, they are vital. But it is when one comes to examine the whereabouts of minerals that the real significance of the rebels' first moves becomes apparent. By their organised

attack from the West they gained control of great sources of those "strategic" metals that are so necessary to the armament programmes of Italy and Germany—two countries greatly lacking in essential raw materials. Thus, the alliance of the rebel generals with Hitler and Mussolini is explained. Very soon after Franco's rebellion began, documents were found in Nazi Headquarters in Barcelona and elsewhere proving beyond a shadow of doubt the close collaboration between German Consulates in Spain and the traitorous generals. Documents have been published by Gollancz in *The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain* and many have been exhibited to the League of Nations. German ramifications in Spain are so great as to demand a separate treatise. Gil Robles promised mining concessions to German industrialists in the event of his success, and all the great German concerns—Metallgesellschaft A.G., I.G. Farben, Siemens and Allied Companies, etc.—are involved in the dominance (through the great Spanish landowners, the Industrialists and the Church) of the sources of metals and the machinery for obtaining and distributing them. Nor are British interests excluded, for there are close relations between some of our old city houses and the German organisations. The Rome-Berlin "axis" so far as Spain is concerned is a collaboration for purely material ends. General Franco willy-nilly has become the puppet of this gigantic conspiracy against the interests of the Spanish people. Hitler has publicly declared that he wants a rebel victory because Germany wants Spanish metals and ores. All this is against British interests, but the purely financial and economic ramifications often explain why some worthy people in this country favour a rebel victory. A rebel victory would provide Hitler and Mussolini with essential raw materials for making the arms, munitions and bombs to be used against Great Britain and France in the event of a European War. Hence, the English people who support the rebel cause are, knowingly or unknowingly, not only the enemies of such ideals as Liberalism and Democracy, but they are actually enemies of our own people and of our most vital interests.