

THE WAR IN SPAIN

A WEEKLY SUMMARY

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BELLIGERENT RIGHTS

IT is probable that from now onwards we shall hear much more than in the past about the question of granting Belligerent Rights to the Spanish rebels, and it seems desirable to set out briefly the different heads under which these Rights may be considered and their effects on the war in Spain. But first let us admit frankly that the subject bristles with difficulties and contains vast possibilities for obfuscation. Yet, for all that, a few fundamental principles are certain; and they are highly pertinent to the issues. In July, last year, Franco sent a Note to the Powers submitting arguments in favour of granting Belligerent Rights to the two sides in the struggle, but it was decided, following the publication of the British plan for revising the Non-Intervention scheme (July 15th, 1937), that qualified and modified Belligerent Rights should be granted and become effective only when the Non-Intervention Committee should place on record their opinion that arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign troops were working satisfactorily and that, in fact, withdrawal had made substantial progress. Nine months have elapsed since then. How many more must elapse before that condition is fulfilled one cannot tell, but meanwhile the sinister doctrine of "Non-Intervention" continues to work in Franco's favour.

First, there is the purely legal aspect of the question, and this has often been defined by jurists. Any State may recognise insurgents as belligerents provided: (a) they occupy a certain part of legitimate Government territory; (b) they have set up a Government of their own and (c) they conduct their armed struggle with the legitimate Government according to the rules and usages of war. Those are the conditions, but let it be noted that, even if they are fulfilled, there is no obligation on any State to grant the Rights—and there is a definite duty not to grant the Rights unless the conditions are completely satisfied.

The rebel leader Franco might attempt to put up some plausible arguments in regard to (a) and (b). He has occupied a part of the *De Jure* Government's territory, and he claims to have set up some sort of Government. True, a little investigation proves that three million people of his occupied territory fled before his surprise onslaught; the original military rebellion failed and, from December, 1936, onwards, turned into an invasion by German and Italian armies, without which it could not have lasted many more weeks; and order is maintained only by methods of terrorism which are outside the bounds of civilised practices, with the aid of an Italian Expeditionary Force and an Administration directed by aliens. Those are significant facts which must not be overlooked, but it is when we come to consider (c) that the rebel case for Belligerent Rights falls utterly to pieces. It is incumbent upon every person who believes in the maintenance of the principles of international law, in so far as they affect the laws and usages of warfare, to fight by every legitimate means against the granting of Belligerent Rights to a self-appointed *Junta* of traitors who have set aside every rule of decency, every moral principle and all the most important rules of international law for the conduct of war.

A Resolution of the Institute of International Law (Neuchâtel, 1900. *Annuaire* Vol. 18) is as follows: "Third Powers should not recognise insurgents as belligerents unless the struggle conducted in their name is by organised forces under military discipline and conforming to the laws and customs of war." That, surely, is clear enough.

Here, it should be emphasised that this Resolution, which contains the principle involved, to conduct war "according to

the laws and customs of war," has nothing to do with standards set by any particular country. It means acting in accordance with a definite Code which is clearly set out in international law. The Code covers war on land, at sea and in the air. On land it forbids the killing of prisoners or wounded; it provides absolute protection for the Red Cross; and it safeguards neutrals. At sea, no ship may be sunk by any means which do not ensure the safety of the crew; a blockade must exist in fact, and be maintained by surface vessels—not by mines or submarines; and prizes must be brought before a properly constituted Prize Court. In the air, attack is only justified against military objectives, and never against non-combatants just because they happen to be in the neighbourhood of military objectives. Aerial bombardment of neutral ships, whether within or without territorial waters, is a crime. All these Rules are clearly enunciated and, for practical purposes, are approved by almost universal consent. One Rule applies with absolute cogency alike to war on land, at sea and in the air: the immunity of non-combatants from direct attack.

What is the record of Franco's side in regard to these fundamental principles for the conduct of war? It is almost too terrible to contemplate. Nor does the evidence all come from what Franco might call "hostile witnesses." His own Generals, and he himself, in fact, have provided sufficient out of their own mouths. It will be remembered that Franco declared to the *News Chronicle* correspondent (July 29th, 1936) that he would "save Spain from Marxism at whatever cost" and the correspondent enquired: "That means you will have to shoot half of Spain?" To which the Saviour replied: "I repeat, at whatever cost." And Queipo de Llano: "I had to impose discipline (in Seville) by inflicting severe penalties. We may have executed 3,000 Marxists in this Province. Our work was that of a Surgeon . . ." And Franco's Order to his higher officers on how to behave on their entry into Madrid: ". . . establish machine-gun posts on roofs of all high buildings. In the event of any opposition . . . streets should be put under fire without any further parleying . . . there should be no distinction of sexes." And Queipo again: "In Salvaleón and Salvatierra, we had to shoot 1,200 men." It is hardly necessary to quote reports from newspaper correspondents, including those of most conservative opinions, regarding the massacre after massacre which occurred in the early days of the rebellion as Franco's Moors and Legionaries hacked their way through villages and towns of civilians. The execution of about 2,000 in the Bull Ring at Badajoz by machine-gunning, and the carnage in the Toledo Hospital, where Moors knifed or killed with hand-grenades the wounded prisoners; the bombing of Guernica; the terroristic air raids on working-class districts of Madrid and Barcelona; the machine-gunning and bombing of thousands of refugees from Málaga; the bombing of the Scottish ambulance unit; the execution of about 2,000 Basques, in repudiation of definite terms of surrender, and attacks on British merchant ships. These are facts. To quote General Queipo de Llano again: "We have struck the word pity out of our dictionary."

From whatever point of view one considers the question, the Spanish insurgents are utterly unworthy of the grant of Belligerent Rights. They are unworthy, because they have not and do not observe the rules of war and because they outrage the canons of civilization. Furthermore, if Great Britain were ever to approve the grant of such Rights, then, as the greatest shipping power in the world, she would be creating a precedent likely to damage her most vital interests.

The "Sage of Seville" speaks again

General Queipo de Llano has never been even in his most sober moments what one might call the soul of discretion. Indeed, he prides himself on his outspoken comments, which have often been so critical of Franco's Salamanca *Junta* and the Burgos authorities that on more than one occasion a row between him and Franco was averted by a narrow margin. It may yet come, for it is no secret that Franco resents the character and personality of the rival who has made himself "Lord and Master" of Andalucia. When the "Generalísimo" formed his new "Government" (see No. 5, page 18 of the Summary), Queipo announced that he would cease from broadcasting—on the grounds that military officers ought not to meddle in politics. Those of us who listened occasionally to his bibulous and racy broadcasts were a little sorry, for he has been a marvellous asset to the Republican Government. When he told a story, it was generally a good one. On February 27th, his name once again appeared in the newspaper headlines, and became a three-days' wonder. This is what actually occurred: On that day a religious-military parade was staged at La Linea, on the edge of Gibraltar. General Queipo de Llano arrived escorted by soldiers in Reichswehr uniform, and officered by German Reichswehr officers, including a colonel, two captains and three lieutenants. The parade began with an open-air mass, at which Father Alfredo Coll, of Málaga, officiated and said some words of spiritual guidance, including an exhortation to the soldiers to massacre without pity their enemies. "For," said Father Coll, "this war is a holy war, and the Nationalists have received from God the power to kill those pagans." There were present some 5,000 soldiers and also a German battalion from the garrison of San Roque. The rebel General Orgaz was a guest of honour. A system of loud speakers had been set up along the frontier, so that the people of Gibraltar should hear what was said, and Queipo de Llano, with characteristic vigour, spoke as follows:—

"I am certain that most of you are Reds, but we do not mind that, for you will soon get your punishment. Gibraltar was lost for us by the cowardice and treachery of those English brigands who have retained it as their own. But we know that they won't stay long there now, for we shall re-take Gibraltar to attach it again to the Motherland. There is no reason why Gibraltar should be anything but Spanish. . . . We must imitate the Italians, for one Italian is worth two Spaniards."

Other versions of Queipo's statement contain further and even stronger remarks, including the phrase "criminals and pirates" applied to the English, who are also referred to as "blackguards." We are not certain what actually was said, afterwards, but that the above statement was made there is no doubt. It was hardly reported in the British press before the rebel agent in London, the Duke of Alba, called at the Foreign Office to present a denial, saying that the alleged statement was "absolutely false." It reminds one of the denial by Franco's staff after the destruction of Guernica, when they said that no aeroplanes had left the ground that day owing to mist! Unfortunately, in the present case there is no doubt of the truth of the gist of Queipo's statement, for it was heard by a member of the Executive Council, the Officer-in-Command of the Gibraltar Constabulary, several Justices of the Peace and many other English people well acquainted with Spanish—so well did they understand the General's words that they left La Linea immediately for Gibraltar. Up to our time of going to press. Queipo de Llano had not been persuaded to deny his statement. In Parliament, Mr. Chamberlain first said that he had no reason to doubt the authenticity of the statement, and later he said that a Note had been received from the Governor of Gibraltar which gave reason for thinking that the speech had been incorrectly reported. The *Evening Standard* put the cap on it, quoting a correspondent (who does not appear to know any Spanish) to the effect that the "splendid speech was a compliment to England!" That does not sound very much like the Queipo we know. Incidentally, the frontier at La Linea had to be closed after the speech, and the strictest control maintained—for fear of hostile demonstrations against the two rebel generals. Why?

Prime Minister's Broadcast

On the night of February 26th, the Prime Minister, Dr. Juan Negrin, broadcast a message to the Spanish people. He first declared that the Spanish Government had always made a point of keeping the country informed of the progress of the war. When Teruel was evacuated, it was made public by the Government before it was reported in Franco's communiqué. "A Government can only act thus," the Prime Minister continued, "when its power is securely based on the confidence and support of the people. The Italo-German command of the rebel army was preparing, since the middle of November, an offensive which was given every kind of publicity by the rebel press and radio, and by the newspapers of the invading countries. Even diplomats of these countries used this offensive in their manoeuvres with

chancelleries. For leaders of the rebellion, it was a trump card which they hoped to use to restore the lowered morale behind their lines. In these circumstances, the Government decided to employ an elementary strategy—to foil the enemy's plans by forestalling them, to impose our will by forcing them to fight on ground of our choosing. In December, an offensive on Teruel was launched; in a week that fortified town was conquered. Thousands of prisoners were taken and a large number of German and Italian aeroplanes brought down. It was then that the entire world learned what we know so well already—that the Republic possessed an Army, not only inspired with the enthusiasm and morale by which in the first months it was able to resist superior forces, but is also in a position to accomplish successfully most daring military undertakings. Our victory was a terrible blow to the enemy. The military prestige of Italy and Germany fell as it did before at Jarama, Guadalajara, Brunete and Belchite. Their diplomatic manoeuvres were compromised. There was an upheaval in the rebel rear, panic for some and rejoicing for others at the strength shown by the army of the Republic. The rebels had to give up their other plans. To recover Teruel, they hurled against our lines their best shock troops, those which had been prepared for an offensive. For two months, whole divisions of the insurgent army fell, one after another, before the bravery of our soldiers. The retaking of the town, which the rebels had thought certain ever since January 1st, proved to be bristling with difficulties. Again the traitors had to ask for help from their foreign masters. Ships loaded with aeroplanes and artillery arrived in the rebel zone from German and Italian ports. It was with these considerable reinforcements of material, paid for with tracts of our country, that the enemy was enabled, after two months of desperate effort, to recover ground that was the graveyard of their best troops.

"When the Republican capture of Teruel was being celebrated, the Government warned the country against over-optimism, convinced that difficult times were not over." Señor Negrin declared: "Teruel was and remains in no way a decisive victory of the war. . . . Our military plan at Teruel had as its fundamental aim the destruction of the enemy plans. The evacuation of the town by our Army does not in any essential way modify the advantages already obtained. The duty and obligation of the moment is to give our soldiers the materials necessary for victory. This leads the Government to impose duties and obligations on the Spanish people. For, just as our successes are only ours, and have never been dishonoured by the shameful protection of others, so we must resolve our difficulties ourselves. Our people has shown on many occasions in the course of its history that it is capable of defending its dignity and independence. Without arms, without an army, betrayed by its Governments, it succeeded a little over a century ago in routing the armies of Napoleon. Disarmed also, caught by treason and perfidy, it had to resist and defeat the military in July, 1936. Now, faced with the aggression of the Fascist powers, it has succeeded in organising a powerful army and will make all the efforts and sacrifices necessary to render it invincible. After this series of battles, after seeing the capacity of our army, weighing carefully the possibilities of the enemy, and reckoning on the inexhaustible energy of our people, I can conclude, without fear of error, that we shall win.

"Against foreign artillery and aviation we must oppose equal masses of Republican artillery and aviation. This can be done. The Government affirms this in the certainty of its knowledge of the anti-Fascist workers who will gladly, by increasing production, give our soldiers the means necessary for victory. In accordance with its needs and with our wish, the Republican army will have at its disposal material it now lacks to overcome the rebel columns and the foreign soldiers who, on equal terms, are inferior to our combatants. To an army supplied with pressed colonials and foreign legionaries, the Republic has opposed the Spanish army, regular and disciplined, capable by itself of ending the war if Europe—some countries of which show the most shameless impudence—did not consent in culpable complacency to allow Germany and Italy to continue sending to the Spanish rebels vast quantities of their latest types of war materials. The war does not end in Spain because Europe does not want it to. Its so-called policy of 'Non-Intervention' is responsible for our greatest sufferings, for the bombardment of open towns, for piracy in the Mediterranean, for the evacuation of Teruel. The material which the democracies have systematically refused to the Government of the Republic, the totalitarian States have supplied, with expert operators, to General Franco. During the first months of the war, these supplies were sent secretly. At present neither Italy nor Germany takes the slightest trouble to waste time in fabricating the appearance of neutrality. While the chancelleries are speculating on the need to find a formula for the withdrawal 'of volunteers,' the material indispensable to the rebels for prolonging the war is leaving the sea and air ports of Germany and Italy for invaded Spain—

high-speed aeroplanes, heavy artillery and automatic arms. If these supplies were stopped, the Spanish war, which justifiably causes anxiety for the peace of Europe, would soon be ended by a victory of the Republic. The war would already be a thing of the past if the rebels had had to rely on their own economic means for war material. Their economic means were exhausted in the first few months and their supplies did not automatically cease because in their indifference towards Spain they did not hesitate to mortgage it to their armament suppliers, Italy and Germany. Those countries sought to assure themselves of an admirable base in the Mediterranean and in the Pyrenees for future attacks on Europe. They sacrificed their armaments of to-day for the benefit of to-morrow, openly giving them to the rebel faction of a country which, although by international law, free and independent, could not find on the world market anyone who would supply arms in return for cash payment. Diplomatic conversations are no longer of any interest to us. Begun in time, efficiently conducted, they might have been useful. To-day no. The invading soldiers can be held back or put to rout—Guadalajara is a proof—by the soldiers of the Republic. *The problem of invading troops is of secondary importance ; of first importance is the problem of armaments.* In wars of long duration—and ours is already that—the adversary, by his vanity, obstinacy or caprice, often helps to increase the strength of the forces he is trying to crush. If the relief of Toledo, by causing the rebels loss of time, caused the failure of their attack on Madrid—it is possible the battle of Teruel signifies that we shall soon see the beginning of the end of the rebels. This depends on our will for work and for victory. At this moment, there is but one thought and but one wish—to crush the enemy. To crush him on the field of battle, and pursue him and unmask his work in the rear. *Our chief problem lies in increasing production ;* and it is to this that we must devote all the means in our power. What we want is a free, independent and happy Spain. We are living in times of sacrifice but also of certainty in victory; times which demand an even greater strengthening of the common will which unites us all, Spaniards, against the enemies of our people. We can say to our heroic combatants: Soldiers of the Army of the People! All Spaniards are driving themselves to superhuman efforts. Surpass yourselves! Not a single inch of ground to the foreigners! With rigid discipline, with conscientious preparation, with unbreakable heroism, make our Army the victorious army of an independent, free and happy Spain."

Manifesto of Spanish Men of Culture

On March 2nd, about 150 Spaniards representing all that is best in contemporary Spanish art, literature and science, published a Manifesto proclaiming their confidence in Dr. Juan Negrin, the Premier, and in the general explanation of policy which he gave in his speech on February 26th. The names of the signatories include those of many men of international reputation—Jacinto Benavente, a Nobel Prizewinner in Literature, for example, with Pablo Picasso, Juan Miró, Victorio Macho, Antonio Machado, José Bergamin, Rafael Alberti, Varro Tomás, Bosch Gimpera, Perez Casas, Pi y Suñer. The following is the text of the Manifesto:—"We have heard the words of warning and confidence broadcast to Spain by the Premier in the name of the Legitimate Government which so worthily represents our country. Profoundly moved by his words, so clear, so courageous and so Spanish, frank and without euphemism—only possible because of the unshakable faith with which the Spanish people to-day support their Government—we, scientists, writers and artists, wish to renew publicly and solemnly our allegiance to the Government of the Spanish Republic, and our resolute decision to help to defend until complete victory, the independence and liberty of Spain. We call upon those intellectuals of Spain who are silenced by Fascism but who are conscious of their duty and the destiny history assigns to our country, to aid from within the enemy camp the victory of the Republic which will bring liberation and the rebirth of Spain. We also call upon the intellectuals of all countries to work unremittingly in favour of the Spanish people who are fighting not only in their own defence but also for universal culture and liberty. The war has hardened us. It has also intensified our patriotic feelings. To-day, more than ever, we feel that we are an integral part of our people. We know that no sacrifice can shake the Spanish people's firm determination to win the war by supporting and aiding the glorious Republican army. In school and laboratory, in whatever posts we may be placed, we will consecrate ourselves to our work with still greater ardour, certain that other workers will do the same in factory and field. This is the only reply our people can give to the call made to all Spaniards by the Legitimate Government through its Prime Minister. We promise to respond to that appeal with all our energy. All must unite to save Spain, betrayed and invaded, but imperishable and certain of victory." Among the signatories are two professors at British Universities, Señores Rio Ortega and Jesus Val.

German Submarines help Franco

The Ministry of National Defence disclosed on March 3rd, 1938, certain authentic and grave information concerning the naval help which Germany is secretly lending to the invasion of Spain. The Ministry has proof that since February, 1937, a number of German submarines have been operating off Spanish coasts. Among these may be mentioned the following: U.29, U.30, U.33, U.34, U.36, and also the U.54, which recently made its appearance. "During the last months of 1937," an official statements records, "some of these submarines were operating along the Cantabrian coast, accompanied by the base ship WOLLIN and, together with the WOLLIN, the submarines dropped anchor several times at Pasajes; on other occasions at Ferrol. The present bases of these submarines are Cádiz, the immediate vicinity of Ceuta and a point on the coast of the Canary Islands. In addition to the WOLLIN, the following ships are carrying out in the ports and off the coasts of Spain the functions of base ships for supplying the submarines: The LISELOTTE, The ESSBERGER, The NEPTUN (a former cable-ship), The AUGUST SCHULTZE. On board all these ships are mechanics and electricians; machinery and material for repairs; supplies of munitions, torpedoes and mines. The German Command has sworn the crews on oath to the most absolute secrecy concerning the movements of these base ships. The AUGUST SCHULTZE, which was recently at Ceuta and Cádiz, and which on several occasions has gone to sea in reply to radio appeals to furnish torpedoes to submarines which have used up those supplied, entered the port of Wilhelmshaven at the end of January, 1938, and left that port on February 12th in the direction of Spain. The personnel of all these ships has participated in the laying of mines in the Mediterranean and in setting nets at the entrance to certain ports, keeping (Franco's) Spaniards informed of this work, meantime."

People's Army increased

Two more classes of men have been called to the Colours in Government Spain. These include men who did their military service in 1929 and are now aged 30, and those, now aged 19, who normally would not have been called to arms until 1940. The registration period expired on March 4th. It is understood that the older men will be sent on active service. The 19-year-old recruits will go to training camps. Their military service will last six months. The superiority in man power which the Government possesses over the insurgents, including the Italians and Germans fighting for Franco, will thus be increased.

Meanwhile, work is being intensified in the Government war industries. The calling up of new classes of conscripts has been made possible by the fact that they can now be supplied with home-manufactured arms. In accordance with a special clause in the decree, each man who reports brings with him a blanket, a knife and fork, and a pair of boots "in good condition." As Dr. Negrin pointed out in his broadcast speech, the problem of loyalist Spain is not so much one of men as of materials. The Government have the bulk of the population on their side. "Non-Intervention" prevents the loyalists from buying materials abroad, whereas Franco obtains men, materials and even naval help from the Dictators. He could not find sufficient Spaniards to enable him to face the Government, which explains why he has had to have the Italian Expeditionary Force and a German Administration and technical staff.

Behind Franco's Lines

We often wish we had more space to provide our readers with gems from Franco's zone. But here are three little ones: The Commission for the Purification of Libraries," published recently in Valladolid a list of "seditious" books to be withdrawn from circulation. On this index are: Stendhal's *Charterhouse of Parma*, *The Lily in the Valley* and *Father Goriot*, by Balzac, *The Lady of the Camelias*, by Dumas, Flaubert's *Sentimental Education*, Carlyle's *Heroes and Hero Worship*, all the works of Dostoyevski, all the works of Blasco Ibañez, the *Essays* of Azorin on French life, certain works by Pio Baroja, and, finally, the *Golden Ass* of Apuleius (seditious!)

The rebel Mayor of Bilbao recently signed a Decree ordering school teachers in that town to wear the following uniforms. Men: black trousers, blue shirt, red beret, black bandolier and cartridge belt. Women: black skirt, blue blouse, red beret. All teachers must wear the Falangist (Fascist) Badge.

Inhabitants in the outskirts of Bilbao have recently had some strange examples of the "law and order" maintained by Franco's authorities. Individuals in Falangist uniform call, search the house, and leave—taking with them anything of value they may find, but without protest from the now experienced Bilbainos. These activities reached such proportions that the authorities have now forbidden any Falangist not on active duty to wear uniform after 11 o'clock at night.

Dr. Brouwer, a distinguished Dutch expert on Spanish affairs, recently gave an address on Franco's Spain to the Catholic Centre of Eindhoven (Holland). He had been at Burgos, and noticed there the complete silence regarding the Pope's Encyclicals about the treatment of Catholics in Germany. Referring to the sermons he had heard, he commented upon the intolerance and violence which they revealed. "From the very pulpit," he said, "they declare that death itself is an insufficient method of vengeance."

Priests and Military Service

On March 1st this year, the Government Minister of National Defence issued the following Order:—


The Minister of National Defence has received letters both from Catholic priests and Protestant pastors, belonging to recently mobilised classes and anxious to fulfil duties imposed on them by law, who request to be assigned to military service which, although involving the same risks as undergone by other soldiers, may permit them not actually to bear arms. It suffices to mention, among these cases, the very curious one of the two Carmelites enrolled by the rebels in the Tercio ranks to fight in the front line against us. These priests, who passed over to our lines, hope with us that they will not have the same treatment and that we shall respect their religious vows. Taking into consideration the circumstances of our war, and anxious not to do violence to the conscience of those who are consecrated to religion, of whatever sort, I have taken the following decision: Centres of recruiting, of mobilisation and military instruction will transfer to the health services those who can give proof of their ecclesiastical condition, whatever religion they profess.

Aerial Warfare: Terrorisation

Air Commodore Charlton, writing in the *United Services Review* of February 17th, stated: "The air treaty recently proposed by the Republican Government, and incontinently rejected by the Nationalists, had a deeper significance than was apparent to the ordinary observer, and becomes, on close examination, so obviously one-sided in its working that it points to the commencing success of the intensive bombing policy. It is one-sided for two main reasons. In the first place it is undeniable, sentiment apart, that the Republican leaders do honestly consider themselves to be representative of Government over the whole of Spain, and, this being so, they would naturally be extremely loth to subject their own people, whom they think of as enchained by Franco, to the horror of repeated air bombardment in mere reprisal for the killing and maiming by means of aircraft which they are undergoing themselves. On the other hand, no such argument applies to Nationalist behaviour. In the eyes of the Burgos *junta* every individual on the other side of the Nationalist front belongs to a 'Marxist horde,' and their obliteration *en masse* on that account would be no bad thing. Gen. Queipo de Llano, in his broadcasts from Radio-Seville, has expressed that identical sentiment. It follows, therefore, that the one side feels itself free to terrorize the civilian population, and that the other is still bound by merciful considerations to refrain from doing so. Secondly, strategic advantage in its use is also for him (Franco). Not so much because his air power, constantly renewable from two inexhaustible sources of outside supply, . . . but for the old reasons of importance and vulnerability which attach to certain cities as targets from the air . . . Barcelona, in its smaller way (1,100,000 inhabitants plus refugees), can be compared with London as a highly favourable target from the air, and as an example of the great advantages of sea-approach. . . . It is evident that Franco is putting his whole reliance on this method of winning the war by terroristic means . . . it is only for Barcelona and other coastal towns to grin and bear until the People's Army, waxing weekly stronger, breaks through the enemy front and proceeds to bear all before it." The army is now nearly ready, the war industry is nearly ready. All that is required is a stoppage in the supply of war materials to the rebels, and the Spanish people would deal with Franco and his existing armies of foreign invaders.

Spoken to Rotarians

In the *Fife Herald and Journal* of February 2nd, 1938, there was a report of an interesting address given by Mr. John H. Williamson, of Kircaldy, to Rotarians, from which the following extracts are culled: "I was in Portugal quite recently, and when there we seemed to be in touch with the war all the time. The very first thing we notice as the steamer draws alongside is the enormous number of motor lorries parked on the quays. As far as I could see they were all American and nearly all Studebakers. These were all on the way to Spain for Franco, and Portugal must have benefitted greatly by the war in spite of non-intervention."



Other Books

We mentioned in last issue the "Penguin Special," *MUSSOLINI'S ROMAN EMPIRE*, by G. T. Garrat, and now we would draw attention to *BLACKMAIL OR WAR*, by Geneviève Tabouis, in the same sixpenny series. We recommend both. The first is by a *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, and tells in some detail of Mussolini's nefarious activities in the Mediterranean up to the end of 1937. It is very enlightening in view of the new Chamberlain orientation in British foreign policy, and provides a mass of material to show that Eden was right in insisting on something being *done* by the Fascist Dictator before Great Britain sits down to negotiate with him. Mussolini's whole record is one of successive and successful breaches of faith. How can one deal with such a man, without the most elaborate guarantees that he will not turn round and betray us the moment he finds it convenient? Madame Tabouis's book should be read with "Mussolini's Roman Empire." She knows what she writes about, and provides warnings enough for Britain. How, she asks in effect, how can we be sure that Germany and Italy will not plunge into that "relentless and overwhelming war" which they are preparing? The danger is that they may choose the moment to do so when they have gained a set of positions strong enough to render British and French action of no avail. Any pact we may sign will be quite useless, for the Dictators do not believe in such silly and out-of-date procedure as the mere declaration of war. One may be quite sure that, in the interests of military procedure, they will act first and talk afterwards. The two books are invaluable just at this moment, for the first shows what Mussolini has already done, and the second explains the motives and principles upon which the modern Dictators work.

Pamphlets

We have now published two more pamphlets: *The Military Situation in Spain after Teruel*, by Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., formerly Air Attaché to H.M. Embassy in Washington, and *How Mussolini provoked the Spanish War*, which contains a facsimile of the famous draft in the handwriting of Don Antonio Goicoechea, Leader of the Monarchists, after his interview with Mussolini and Balbo on March 31st, 1934, outlining the terms of Italian help for a military insurrection in Spain. The pamphlet also contains a full translation of the document in question, and some explanations, together with proof of the authenticity of the document. Essential.

As for the first pamphlet, we shall content ourselves with saying that it is the fullest and best-balanced statement of the military problems and the present situation in Spain that has yet been published. It contains more than one surprise for those who have not followed the war very closely. Especially valuable is the section dealing with the war at sea, about which the press is so abysmally ignorant. England was very surprised when the Government Fleet sank Franco's battleship on 6th March. The growth of the new army is described, and an analysis is made of General Franco's "Three Grave Errors." (The price of both pamphlets is 2d. 3d., including postage).