THE WAR IN SPANISH A WEEKLY SUMMARY

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WHY THE WAR CONTINUES

ITH the New Year, the war in Spain entered upon a new phase. The Government victory at Teruel (to which we shall refer later) convinced observers acquainted with the struggle that a turning point had been reached. The first phase of the war was an onslaught by the Army, using Moors and desperadoes of the Foreign Legion as shock-troops against the people of Spain and their elected Government. That Government and people resisted, and a hastily organised and ill-equipped militia put up such a fight that the rebel leaders had to appeal for help to foreign countries.

Then followed a phase which can only be described as the invasion of Spain by Italian armies, thousands of German technicians, with masses of German and Italian war material, aeroplanes, etc. What had been planned by the reactionaries as a quick, overwhelming movement, developed into a war in which the Government forces fought for each foot of soil against great odds-retreating here, holding on there, mostly retreating but, as on the Guadalajara front, at Brunete and a few other places, occasionally inflicting forceful indications that their military capacity was improving. Out of the improvised militia of the early days a fine modern army was growing. It remained for this army to demonstrate that it could take an offensive on a fairly wide scale, pursue the offensive to a point of undoubted success, and consolidate the gains. That happened at Teruel. The next step will consist in a further series of Government offensives-the next phase of the war.

Most readers of the daily press realise that the civil war in Spain is a full-dress modern war on a great scale, in which there are features—the annihilation of civilian populations by aerial bombing, for example—which provide a foretaste of what we may expect if a European war should come upon us one of these days. Few understand the underlying causes of the events in Spain, and it may be useful to sketch them briefly.

When Municipal Elections of April, 1931, resulted in the abdication of Alfonso XIII, a democratic Republic was constituted. The task of that first Republican Government was formidable. It had to solve the worst land problem existing in Europe, possibly in the world. Here are the sinister statistics of that problem:—

1% of the population owned 51.5% of the total land.

14%	,,,	"	,,,	35.2%	,,	,,
20%	,,,	,,,	33	11.1%	33	33
25%	,,	,,	33	2.2%	>>	,,
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40% of the population owned nil!

On the one side there was a small group of rich and mostly absentee landowners; on the other, an impoverished and desperate peasantry living in conditions that shocked the feelings of all but their masters.

The second great task of the Republic was to solve the Church problem, which was interlocked with the first. The Roman Catholic Church in Spain was more powerful than any other institution. It consisted of 106,734 members of the clergy and religious orders; there was one priest for every 900 Spaniards. It dominated education, the key to the minds of the people; even in 1930, about 45 per cent. of the people could not read or write. It was also owner and controller of great wealth. Don Valentin Ruiz Senén, for example, representing the Society of Jesus, was President of nine vast undertakings such as the Madrid tramways; Vice-President of six; and a director of 28 others. He drew a million-and-a-half pesetas per annum personal income from those sources! In the last Budget under the Monarchy, from the taxpayers' money, there was allocated a sum of approxi-

mately sixty million pesetas to help maintain the State Church. So vast a sum (equivalent to nearly two-and-a-quarter million pounds sterling) from a public fund at a time when health, education and other social services were neglected and while peasants starved !—is it necessary to say that anti-clericalism grew apace? Note: anti-clericalism, and not anti-religious feeling.

The third problem was the Army, always the weapon used by Landowners and Clericals to maintain their hold on the wealth of the country. It was an Army with three curious characteristics:
(1) it was organised for use in Spain, and not in foreign wars;
(2) the officer caste was carefully selected, mostly from the sons of the wealth-owners, and its numbers were out of all proportion to the number of men—one officer for half-a-dozen or so men; and (3) three-fifths of the total Budget allowance for the Army went on salaries for officers.

The three forces outlined above, the Landowners, the Church and the Army, formed an alliance against the young Republic of 1931, worked against it with all their ability, and returned to power in 1934—from which moment they reversed every progressive attempt of the Republican Governments. Then came the February elections of 1936, when the united progressive elements, calling themselves "Popular Front," won a general election with 277 seats in Parliament against 164 of the Right and Centre, and about 20 Independents, etc.

From that moment the reactionaries began to work for the overthrow of the Government by force. They spread a story to the effect that Communists were about to turn Spain into a Soviet Republic (there were 15 Communist Deputies out of the 453 in Parliament and not one in the Government). They said that the Popular Front deputies were red revolutionaries, whereas they were:—

Lawyers . 130 Writers . . . 23
Professors . 34 Engineers . . . 20
Doctors . . 31 Other Professions . . 3
Representatives of workers and peasants, etc. . . 36

A less extreme collection of men could hardly be imagined: but they were aware of the fundamental problems of Spain, and pledged themselves to a progressive, peaceful programme. The actual ministry continued to be democratic republican, without even one Socialist. Never mind! They must be smashed, and the Land and Wealth and Power of Spain must be assured once and for all time to the few. That was the cause of the military rebellion of July 17th, 1936. Antonio Goicoechea, leader of the Renovación Española, a very extreme Right Party, has announced publicly that since March, 1934, the Right Wing parties, including his own, had been planning a military rising which "if necessary for the safety of Spain should be a civil war." He declared that he and his friends "went to Italy to secure the support not only of the Italian Government but of the Fascist party in the event of civil war in Spain." We know that General Sanjurjo went to Germany with the same object in 1936. The plans were laid, and the fury burst on the Spanish people in that fateful July of 1936. Owing to the anti-Spanish, unpatriotic spirit of the leaders of the rebel movement, what started as a sordid army revolt in favour of feudal values almost led to a European war.

The unequalled creative and fighting spirit of the people of Spain, in the face of that conspiracy and surprise onslaught, have made Hitler and Mussolini realise how dangerous is the enterprise upon which they embarked. The war must continue until they are out of Spain, with all that they stand for.

Population

Reiteration of a mis-statement in regard to the numbers of Spaniards in rebel and loyalist territory has caused many people (including Mr. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) to believe that about two-thirds of the Spanish population are in the rebel zone; and hence, by implication, that they support Franco. Few touches of rebel propaganda have been more effective than this. Yet it is an error which can be corrected by considering the history of the first 18 months of the struggle,

together with the division of Spain on, say, January 1st, 1938.

In the first place, if one totals up the *normal* population of these two areas, there is a superiority on the Government side of approximately one million. Barcelona and Madrid were and are the two most populous cities in the Peninsula and, although nearly half-a-million people have been evacuated from Madrid, the refugees who came to the capital from the Franco terror

were almost as numerous.

Refugees who fled before the Franco terror (as his African savages and cut-throat Legionaries advanced) and took refuge in Government territory—these have been mostly counted and registered: THREE MILLIONS. With possibly another million not counted.

That leaves a definite numerical superiority in population on

the Government side.

Take those now remaining in the Franco zone. In the Basque country, in the Austurias—here the whole population is hostile to Franco. Also in many parts of Extremadura and nearly the whole of Andalucia. This we know-no censorship can obscure it.

Finally, what of those thousands of helpless, harmless in-articulates in Franco's zone? Those people who, like the in-habitants of Teruel, show their feelings for loyalist Spain by crying aloud their joy as the Government troops advance?

It is time for those who claim to be impartial to realise that the Franco régime is one of force, with four-fifths of the Spanish people against it. Otherwise, he would not have to depend on Italians for police work as well as for fighting. That is the latest phase of degradation to which Spaniards in Franco's zone must submit, of which we shall give some detailed accounts in later issues.

Deserters from the Rebel Army

From what has been written above, it will be obvious that the spanish sections of the rebei army are not too reliable in a military sense. If further proof were required, it is to be found in the vast numbers of desertions from insurgent to Government lines during the whole of the year 1937—numbers which increased steadily towards the end of the year. After the rebel defeat at Teruel became known on other fronts, there was a further increase. The Government uses loud speakers to inform Spaniards in the rebel lines that, if they abandon their rebellion and come over to the side of the legally constituted Government,

their lives will be respected.

This increase in the numbers of deserters, with other factors, indicates the discontent and demoralisation in the rebel zone, notwithstanding one great asset which Franco has: a superior food supply and interior communications. The superior food supply is due chiefly to the fact that he has a whole frontier and seaboard—that of Portugal—open for the entry of supplies. The interior communications are due to the simple military fact that the rebellion was planned in the first instance by generals who took into account military considerations, which included the important lines of communications in South and West Spain and direct contact with Portugal. They won those communica-tions by surprise and shock-tactics in the early days of their

It should be noted that, from the beginning, desertions from the loyalist to rebel lines have been few and far between, and have dwindled to negligible numbers. On the Government side there is a morale and unity which improves with the passage of

time. That is the difference.

Steps to Check Desertions

An insurgent military order is reproduced below. It is from a Colonel to a Captain of the 17th Infantry Regiment on the Aragon front, and was originally issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Army to the General in command of the Fifth Division:

"In order that all sectors on the front should work with maximum efficiency," reads the order, "and to maintain and ensure the morale of the troops, and in order to avoid such occurrences as recently took place on the Madrid front, the

following instructions should be noted: (a) Within each sector, there is to be by day and night, a member

of the military who is not a member of the militia in command. Units of the Requeté and Falange are to be distributed among the military.

(c) In each company or similar unit, intelligence agents will be appointed to learn the feelings and morale of the troops, and to expose any who attempt to desert.

(d) Deserters who are caught are to be punished immediately

in exemplary fashion."

Frontier Guards Reinforced

By January 13th, as a result of increasing desertions from the province of Andalucia, all frontier guards were reinforced and given machine-guns. A special cavalry regiment is now posted at the frontier between La Linea and Gibraltar, which previously was watched only by Civil Guards. The soldiers have orders to shoot on sight anyone suspected of deserting. From the north also comes confirmation of measures which have to be taken by the insurgents to prevent the flight of deserters over the frontier. At Elizondo and surroundings, 400 Civil Guards and Caribineers have been concentrated. The garrisons of and Caribineers have been concentrated. The garrisons of Armeguy and Vera have been increased and all services placed under the direction of an army general. Despite all measures the number of deserters from Franco's side increases. Not a day passes without a number crossing the frontier.

The "Nationalists"

Those who imagine that Franco's movement and military forces are inspired by some mystical unity have little knowledge of the facts, which are as follows. The rebel army consists of:

(1) The part of the original army which, with the simple loyalty

of surprised soldiers, obeyed the revolting officers. The rank and file of this is now disillusioned.

(2) The Falange, consisting of the pre-rebellion Fascists and the mostly conscripted youth. Hostile to Franco.

(3) The Carlists or Requetés, who are at loggerheads with (1)

and (2) above.

(4) Hired mercenaries—Moors and Foreign Legionaries—who have no interest in the struggle beyond that of money and loot. The Moors have had such a cutting-up that Franco's supply has run out. He can now find only boys, and very few of them, willing to come from Morocco.

(5) The Italian Expeditionary Force sent by Mussolini to help

to gain control of the Mediterranean coast of Spain and to establish beside totalitarian Portugal a totalitarian Spain. The Italians are detested by the civil population in the rebel zone, and despised because of their skedaddle at Guadalajara.

(6) An army of German technicians, aviators, advisers, etc. These hate and distrust the Italians. They have been sent from Germany to help the rebel cause in order that Herr Hitler may obtain ores and submarine bases for use against France and especially against England. Franco's upper-class elements and vested interest representatives work well with the Germans. The ordinary people dislike them almost as much as they dislike the Italians—but not quite!

This, then, is the hotch-potch and mixtura diaboli assembled under the title of "Nationalist" army.

Fighting against them is the Government army which, with the exception of the volunteer International Brigade (about 15,000 men) and a small number of other foreign technicians, is Spanish, and inspired with the idea of ridding Spanish soil of its unsayoury invaders, and with the ultimate goal of establishing a system of government of Spaniards by Spaniards in the interests of all Spaniards, and not of the few dangerous and unpatriotic people who have hitherto controlled the wealth of Spain and the bodies and souls of her population.

The Elected Government

Against the self-styled "Nationalist" Junta and foreign invaders, there is the Spanish People's Army—improvised by the elected Government with the whole-hearted support of the people. The result is, in Government territory, a unity of purpose, a single-mindedness, a co-ordination of effort and a strength which, in the face of rebel and foreign aggression, has

provided a lesson in morale to the whole world.

The present Government of Spain is under the Presidency of Don Manuel Azaña, a former Civil Servant and distinguished writer, of the Republican Left Party. The Prime Minister is Dr. Juan Negrin, a famous biologist, and moderate Socialist. The Minister of Defence is Indalecio Prieto, a newspaper owner formerly, and a stalwart Socialist. The Cabinet consists altogether of: three Socialists, one Left Republican, one Conservative Republican, one representative of the Catalan Left, one Basque Catholic and two Communists.

It has no Left Socialists, no Anarchists, no Syndicalists and no Left Wing (Trotskyist) Communists.

The portfolio of Justice was first held by the Basque Roman Catholic, Señor Irujo.

Its policy may be summarised as: (1) discipline and the suppression of extremism and (2) the co-ordination of all effort towards winning the war for the people of Spain.

In England the opinions of most members of this Government

would be considered as liberal-democratic.

It is the sort of Government which would coincide approximately in political principles with those of an English Government under the premiership of the late Lord Oxford and Asquith; or Mr. Lloyd George's Coalition.

It is no more "red" than the average English Government.

Franco and Religion

Perhaps the most cynical untruth spread by rebel supporters is to the effect that General Franco and his movement represents is to the effect that General Franco and his movement represents a crusade "to re-establish Christianity, the Christianity of the Roman Catholic Church" in Spain. To cement and fortify this lie, lurid stories are told of church-burnings and priest-killings by Government supporters in the early days of the rebellion. That unruly elements among the surprised and attacked population of Spain gave vent to their anti-clerical feelings in acts of violence cannot be denied. But that any such act was countenanced or approved by the Government is untrue. In fact, the Government did all in its power to stop and prevent such acts, none of which occurred later than November, 1936. The chief reasons for violent acts by the people were that rebel The chief reasons for violent acts by the people were that rebel leaders used Churches as strategic points for military purposesas stores for arms and supplies, as machine-gun nests, etc. This outraged the feelings not only of anti-clerical elements but those of the thousands, even millions of good Roman Catholics who are not out-and-out reactionaries. The Basques—an old, conservative and Catholic people—remained and remain against the rebel movement, to quote the words of Don José Aguirre, Leader of the Basque Catholic Nationalist Party, "because of our undeviating Christian and Catholic principles."

It is difficult, in a few words, to explain this deeply-rooted religious question, but perhaps the best way to do so is by holding fast to the chief factor in it: the economic and financial, and not the purely religious. Because, on the purely religious aspect, we find millions of Catholics supporting each side in the struggle, but on Franco's side we find in Spain those whose interests are allied to land-holding, wealth, big-business and reaction, while on the Government side we find the sincere Catholics who believe in such obvious necessities as land for the people, a fair distribution of wealth and respect for racial minorities.

Franco eliminates everybody irrespective of religion who is republican, or favours land-reform, the revision of church power and wealth in the interests of the poor and down-trodden peasants and workers. He has executed 150 Roman Catholic priests because they held by these essentially Christian principles. Writing of Franco's executions in general, the Roman Catholic Bishops have made this important statement: "In Majorca only 2 per cent. (of the shot) have died impenitent; in the southern regions no more than 20 per cent.: and in the north they do not

regions no more than 20 per cent.; and in the north they do not reach, maybe, more than 10 per cent."

Protestants, it should be noted, are treated with Jews as out-and-out enemies by this "Christian" Crusader Franco who, when he dares move about in the light of day, has to have

an escort of well-picked MOORS.

The shameless blasphemy of all this shocks people who are not Roman Catholics. It has prompted a great Catholic writer, Jacques Maritain, to refer to Franco's rule as a White Terror. And it has caused millions of good Catholics all over the world to recoil in horror.

when a newspaper correspondent asked General Franco about his "Crusade to Save Spain at whatever cost" and realized what this "Crusade" represented, he said: "That means that you will have to shoot half of Spain."

To which Franco replied: "I repeat—at whatever cost."

Extermination of the Basques

"At whatever cost"—the history of the rebel campaign in the Basque country is unique in the history of cruelty and terrorisation. Some of it is recorded in the files of newspapers of world-wide reputation, some in the pathetic words of Basque priests writing of their annihilated flocks, and some in a well-documented book *The Tree of Gernika*, by G. L. Steer. (Published by Hodder & Stoughon, London. Illustrated. 12s. 6d.)

It is not our intention to dwell upon atrocities. But we would draw attention to the rebel idea of "honour" and what may be called the rules of war. When Bilbao surrendered, terms were made, and they applied to a group of 2,500 Basque Catholics cut off in the little peninsula of Santona. One clause provided that the leaders of this group should be given their freedom. Many of them have been executed after a mock trial. Between December 14th, 15th and 16th, 1937, eighty prisoners were executed. The rebel newspaper *Hierro* of Bilbao of December 22nd has given, under the heading of "Sentences carried out" and with the note "In fulfilment of sentences passed by Tribunals, the following condemned persons have been executed by garrotting" a list, of which we can provide any reader with a copy, containing eighty names of men and the names of three women. The latter were shot.

Apparently the reason for these executions is that the Basque people, after their gallant struggle against the Italian Expeditionary Force and the German and Italian air fleets, have fallen into a state of passive resistance. Hence they must be terrorised—
"At whatever cost!" Those who were executed received the
Last Rites of the Church, and died with the cry: "Long live
the free Basque country."

Battle of Teruel

Fairly full accounts of the Government's drive towards and capture of Teruel have been given in the world's press, and it is unnecessary to give further details here. It was, from the Government point of view, a dangerous sector—a menacing finger pointing at Valencia, and a good starting-point for any rebel attempt to cut off Catalonia from the rest of Spain. The town is situated in difficult territory, most of which is about 3,000 feet above sea level. The difficulties of attacking the Government line caused the rebel staff to hesitate. But they kept the valuable town well fortified and provided a strong garrison. Weather conditions in winter are so appalling that military activities dwindle to routine point. Little was expected on or from either side until early spring.

In these circumstances, with the further advantage (or disadvantage) of a blizzard, the Government began a well-planned and well-organised offensive on December 15th. It came as a surprise to the garrison—and to the world. By December 21st Teruel itself was occupied, as were many villages to the north, south and west. The Government advance was rapid, but reinforcements were rushed to the garrison; the Government forces retired to take up positions prepared and also reinforced. The alternatives facing General Franco were either to recapture the town in order to reassert his prestige; or to defend his new positions as best he could. In the first he failed, and then he fell

back on the second.

Significance of Teruel

The general significance of this Government victory is given below, from the rebel point of view as voiced by an important German newspaper, and from the Government's, as expressed

by the general staff.

The success demonstrated that the Government army is now one of first-rate fighting capacity: well disciplined, well equipped and with magnificent morale. It has shown that it can achieve those most important features of warfare: take the initiative, win objectives and hold them. It is not yet possible to calculate the full repercussions of this victory, which has distracted the rebel general staff, and given great heart to all supporters of democratic Spain. That alone is sufficient for the moment.

German Opinion on Teruel

The Frankfürter Zeitung of January 11th, published a long article under the title "Four weeks of Battles at Teruel," from which we quote the following: "In no battle of the Spanish Civil War have there been involved so many regiments, so much artillery-fire or so great losses in lives as that around Teruel. . . The attack was first directed on the Northern and Southern outskirts and then on the road from Teruel to the West, like two folding arms. It was made by masses of *superior troops*, whose preparations had been kept a close secret and, delivered with surprising strength, the attack of the Government militia thus reached its first objectives. After one week the Nationalist garrison of the town was completely cut off from the outside world. On December 22nd, militia penetrated into the town

itself from all sides.

"Franco himself—according to our information—was preparing his offensive elsewhere on a wide front of 1,300 kilometres (808 miles): Madrid and Malaga. Purely military considerations must have compelled him to submit coolly to the losses of the positions at Teruel and even the imminent capitulation of his garrison; and to abandon his plan for a great offensive There are moments when moral considerations are so strong that no stragetical calculation can cancel them. When General Franco was confronted with the dilemma of abandoning his soldiers and police corps (Civil Guards) besieged in Teruel or for the moment abandoning his general offensive, he decided to go to the rescue of his comrades. . . . The Nationalists did not succeed in penetrating the town nor—their chief objective—in closing the circle around it, threatening the attackers' communications to the point of forcing them to abandon Teruel. . . . Now the Government troops have the town in their power they have succeeded, even causing General Franco to delay his offensive, and further, in demonstrating to public opinion in their own territory and abroad the military value of the newly-created army. It is therefore a psychological victory. Another

lesson emerges from the four weeks of this struggle. Once again the Spanish Civil War has frustrated the hopes of the professors of strategy who expected from modern armaments a rapid denoument in military campaigns and a return to war of movement."

It should be noted that, as all General Franco's principal technical officers are Germans, and some of his general staff officers also, the German newspaper correspondents on his side have better sources of information than the others. The importance of this summing up of the always well-informed Frankfürter Zeitung is obvious.

Review of Battle of Teruel

The Bulletin of the Government General Staff published on January 11th the following commentary on the Battle of Teruel:

"Since December 15th we have been manœuvring and encircling the enemy, and the enemy has only been able to roar and grind his teeth. Franco must, and certainly does, know that a General who cannot impose strategic conditions on the enemy has lost half the battle. Military miracles are extremely rare; war is always method, discipline, order and execution. The armed people who were obliged to reply to the regular army when it revolted learned this to their cost.

"The battle of Teruel began with a sudden and well-prepared action by the Republican forces who, in six days, broke, isolated and encircled the enemy and established a defensive

front against the probable arrival of relief columns, and then proceeded to enter the town.

"Rey Dancourt and Barba (the defending officers in command) received orders to resist and they resisted without pity for the women, old people and children beseiged with them, who were

dying of hunger and thirst.

"Franco employed his full resources to break the Republican defences and the significance of this was that it meant the adjournment of his plan of an irresistible offensive. Logic should have led him to proceed as at Belchite, that is, to admit the blow, show that he was a good loser and reinforce his lines while continuing the preparation of his plan.

"A chief desirous of conserving his forces and capable of learning from the incident, would have abandoned the battle of Teruel on December 22nd or 23rd. Franco continued to fight for the benefit of his foreign gallery, and used the cream of his

shock troops and his mechanised forces to no avail.

"The war will change, because we will no longer be the anvil but the hammer; and we will strike hard and truly. There is no pause possible when our dead are crying out to be avenged, and our anguished country yearns for liberty and independence.

A SPANISH Victory

The victories of Franco, from the beginning of his campaign, were not Spanish victories. Moors and Legionaries were his original weapons. For the Basque victories he had one dozen Italian Generals and an Italian Expeditionary Force, with German and Italian aviation. The Government won their victory at Teruel with Spaniards—none of the volunteer International Brigade took part. It was the first Government victory of importance in 100 per cent. Spanish. victory of importance: 100 per cent. Spanish.


Queipo: The Sage of Seville

General Don Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, whose military career before July, 1936, was varied, naturally threw in his lot with the rebels and, by what has been called by his friends "a shrewd piece of bluff," seized Seville from its unsuspecting inhabitants. His military career since then has been noteworthy and comes the bending of the community of what he under two headings: (1) Cleansing the countryside of what he calls Marxists—that is, any man, woman or child who did not immediately join the rebel cause, or who, before July, 1936, had been seen reading any but a clerical or reactionary newspaper. And (2) Broadcasting on the radio. Quiepo has become famous for the "frankness" of his broadcasts, many of which are so obscene that, to reproduce them in an English newspaper, would

involve proprietor, editor and printer in a criminal prosecution.

One day it may be possible—as a pathological joke—to publish in England for private circulation a complete unexpurgated collection of "Queipismos"—ex cathedra statements and, better, the obiter dicta of this "glorious Nationalist" Sage of Seville. His manner of broadcasting is unique—vigorous and Rabelaisian. He never hesitates to abuse anybody—including the Salamanca "Señoritos"—and his statements about distinguished foreigners who dislike rebel activities are those of a vituperative ignoramus. However, let us acknowledge his "frankness," of which we now give a few examples. And of which we shall publish, from time to time, some gems. "Moorish soldiers were keener on sacking than on fighting.

QUEIPO: THE SAGE OF SEVILLE



BROADCASTS TO THE WORLD

We had to shoot some of them to impose discipline—and their

fellow-countrymen tried to mutiny!

"Agents introduced themselves into Valverde's army and bought a hundred soldiers of the Tercio (foreign legion) offering them fabulous rates of pay. 2,500 men under Valverde dwindled overnight to 600."

N.B.—The Tercio with the Moors were the only "Nationalists"

on whom Franco could rely-until he found the Germans

and Italians . . . Arriba Espana!

"When I occupied Seville with a few troops, I had to impose 'discipline'—by inflicting severe penalties. It is quite possible that we may have executed 3,000 Marxists in this Province. Our work was that of a surgeon: we amputated a diseased limb in order to preserve society."

N.B.—There was no question of "popular support."

"The system of Colonel Yaguez in Badajoz was to ask the popular element whether they wished to serve with our army. A

negative reply was an indication that they were Marxists, and they were naturally shot. Many of them, after gaining the confidence of our officers, mutinied. That happened in Salvaleón and Salvatierra-where we had to shoot 1,200 men. . . . Such difficulties delay the advance of troops."

"Besides, you must not forget that the Church itself, in the

days of Philip II, had to apply the cautery, and the Autos de Fe of that time supply a justification for the execution of Marxists. You must remember that before executing them we give them a chance of confessing and repenting. Every Marxist who has so desired has received the Sacraments before being executed.

"There is now a religious enthusiasm in Spain such as had

not been witnessed for centuries."

The words of the Sage of Seville will be continued in a later issue. If you have a wireless set and understand Spanish, it were better that you listen for yourself.

Financial Relations with Great Britain

The Financial News of January 6th commented on the action of the Spanish Government in making arrangements for the of the Spanish Government in making arrangements for the payment to England of post-clearing credits as "certainly commendable" for "making this effort in order to clear the name of Spain from the stigma of default," and adds that the rebels "for current deliveries" pay cash—"otherwise they would not get the goods, but it was left to the Barcelona Government to pay debts which should be paid by the Franco Government."

Forthcoming Publications

We have in preparation for publication the following works, of which details and prices will be announced later: Franco's Rule of Terror; A Controversy on Spain between the Editor of the Morning Post and Mr. A. Ramos Oliveira, the Spanish author; Foreign Journalists under Franco's Terror; The Military Situation in Spain (up to February, 1938). Also an illustrated monthly.