

THE WAR IN SPAIN

A WEEKLY SUMMARY

EDITED BY CHARLES DUFF

UNITED EDITORIAL LTD.

No. 3

LONDON, 5th FEBRUARY, 1936

PRICE 1d.

BRITAIN AND "THE NATIONALISTS"

THOSE who have followed events in Spain since July, 1936, will remember that, in the first days of the military rebellion, all sections of the English press referred to the rebels as rebels. The movement of generals was everywhere regarded as an attempted *coup d'état* or, as Spaniards call it, a *pronunciamiento*: which, of course, it was. Very little time elapsed, however, before even those observers abroad who were not well acquainted with the internal situation in Spain began to realise that the conspiracy of traitorous generals had ramifications far outside the Peninsula. Italian aeroplanes covered the landing of Franco's Moors and cut-throat Legionaries, and it was disclosed (*Daily Herald*, August 1st, 1936) that the German bombing planes which were loaded for the rebels in July, had been ordered by General Sanjurjo in March. The *Manchester Guardian* of July 25th, 1936, stated: "During the week large numbers of Italian and German agents have arrived in Morocco and the Balearic Islands. These agents are taking part in military activities, and are also exercising a certain political influence. For the insurgents the belief that they have the support of two great powers is an immense encouragement; for many of the weapons now in their hands are of Italian origin." Gradually the full story came to light. Even while they were re-affirming and solemnly re-swearing their allegiance to the Republic, the conspiring generals were selling their country to the foreign Fascists. As an excuse or explanation, the Fascist propaganda machine began to disseminate the lie that the movement had been prompted by a desire "to save Spain from Bolshevism." At which point, those of us who knew anything about Spanish politics realised that Hitler and Mussolini intended to use Franco as their puppet, and his "movement" as a means of gaining control of the Peninsula and Morocco. Intervention had begun and, while Hitler did not say much, he acted. Mussolini declared publicly that the Italian Government was fully prepared to take whatever interventionist steps it considered necessary. Meanwhile, the rebel movement, with nice effrontery, took upon itself the title of "Nationalist" and our newspapers changed the word "rebel" to "insurgent," and gradually came to use the word "Nationalist" in reference to this international conspiracy and motley army of Moors, Legionaries, Germans and Italians, to which has recently been added some units of African savages from Ifni—gentlemen who wear nose and ear-rings and who paint and tattoo their bodies! The "Nationalists" now require only a few head-hunters from Borneo and some South Sea Islanders to complete the picture. Franco's Spain is administered largely by Germans and policed by Italians, his air force and artillery and mechanised units are all German-Italian—it is these foreigners who are devastating the country in the interest of the Dictators' power-politics.

Where does England stand in regard to all this?

Let us look back, and attempt to explain something of the importance of Spain to us. To begin with, let no English person forget three episodes of Anglo-Spanish history: (1) *The War of the Spanish Succession* (1701-13), which drew the battle lines of Europe for the next century; (2) *The Peninsula War* (1808-14), which was the beginning of the end of Napoleon; and (3) *The Moroccan Crises* in the beginning of the present century, which lined up the opposing forces of the World War of 1914-18. In the first, England went to war to prevent the foreign domination of Spain; in the second, we helped the Spanish people to expel a foreign invader; and, in the third, a threat to Morocco by Germany resulted in Anglo-French pre-war military co-operation.

In short, it has always been in the past a basic principle of British foreign policy to prevent, at any cost, any threat to Spanish independence. And for a very good reason: *a Spain dominated by a foreign power is a direct threat to our most vital interests.* Spain is the key to the Mediterranean; and to our Atlantic and African and South American trade routes. An enemy in possession of Spain can sink the ships which bring us petrol, meat, grain, cotton, foodstuffs and—almost everything on which we live.

When the military rebellion began in July, 1936, French and British statesmen were aware of the danger to European peace, and the Blum Government (prompted from London) in a well-meaning desire to prevent a general conflagration, and to tie the hands of the international Fascists, started the policy of "Non-Intervention." Then began the famous game of dilly-dally and obstruction by Germany, Italy and Portugal, while they gave every possible help to the Spanish rebels; and the constitutionally-elected Government was prevented from freely purchasing abroad the arms it required. By international law they were *and are* fully entitled to buy arms, but the "Non-Intervention" policy is the brake. Meanwhile, Germany and Italy have invaded Spain; and Franco is reduced from the status of a traitorous rebel general to that of a puppet.

Had the *De Jure* Government of Spain been permitted the benefits of international law, and had the Dictators kept out, the people of Spain would have made short work of the rebels. It would all have been over in three or four months. The reversal of Britain's fundamental policy in regard to Spain—that is, in permitting the invasion of the Peninsula by our potential enemies—has brought about a state of affairs far worse than any that could ever have been contemplated. For, if one admits (just for the sake of argument) a rebel victory, the problem will remain: how to get the Italian Expeditionary Force and the German Administration out of Spain. The Berlin-Rome axis will have achieved its goal. It is ridiculous to suppose that, having achieved dominance of the Peninsula, Germany and Italy would turn round and abandon it. Only a fool could be so naïf as to believe that.

Every one of Franco's "victories" last year was due to help he received from Italy and Germany. Málaga was taken by a force of at least 16,000 Italians, described by that distinguished eye-witness, Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell, as a well-disciplined and soldierly body compared with the rabble of Falangists, etc., which entered the town after them. By the time the campaign against the Basques had begun, there were about 100,000 Italians in Spain—with thirteen Italian generals! They have not won the war for Franco and, apparently, another 100,000 are required if he is to hold what he has won. Spain is a disconcerting country once her people are aroused; it is doubtful if a quarter-of-a-million alien troops could win the Fascist cause.

An acute observer in the French press reports that Mussolini is determined to try another gamble in Spain; and to extend his operations generally in the Mediterranean. Tonnage of 182,000 has been mobilised to transport men and material to Spain—a force of 50,000 men and as much material as may be required. Will Germany be drawn by Rome into this fresh "Nationalist" offensive against the Spanish people? If what this French observer reports is true, then we are approaching a very critical period for British interests in the Mediterranean. It is fairly obvious that our interests do not coincide with those of the "Nationalists" but with those of the friendly constitutional Government, whose only desire is to be independent.

"The Tree of Gernika"

The *Observer* of January 30th reported that the book written by G. L. Steer under this title as a field study of Franco's campaign in the Basque country is a best seller; and it deserves to be. Mr. Steer was *Times* correspondent, and it was his famous despatch to that newspaper regarding the bombing of Guernica (or Gernika) which horrified the civilized world. We wish we had space to review the book at length, but here we can only use a quotation from it to show how "Non-Intervention" has worked.

"Weak and ill-organised though she was," he writes, "Santander was not fated to fall to the Spanish rebels. Her conquest was due not only to the aviation and artillery of Germany and Italy, but to the predominant numbers and the overwhelming armament of the Italian infantry engaged. Santander was not a victory for Franco. . . . The troops invading Santander were three Italian Divisions of 5,000 each, two Navarrese Divisions (60th and 61st) of the same size, two *tabors* of Moors, and eight or nine mixed squadrons of Moorish and Spanish cavalry. In other words, Mussolini's contribution to Franco's army, after a year of Non-Intervention, exceeded Franco's own. The Italian troops, composed of the *Flechas Negras* (Black Arrows). *Llamas Negras* (Black Flames) on March 23rd, were endowed with the regulation armament of the Italian army. Each *Bandera* or Battalion of 850 men included one machine-gun company of 12 machine guns, and each platoon of 30 men carried two machine-gun rifles. The Division, in fact, developed a fire of automatic weapons incomparably stronger than anything in the Basque or the Santander armies. Their artillery was even more formidable. Each *Bandera* was armed with a battery of 65 mm. light artillery, and two German anti-aircraft guns. Eighteen batteries ranging from 155 mm. (6 in.) to 75 mm. (3 in.) supported each Division, and provided an artillery orchestration twice as powerful as those behind regular divisions on manoeuvres in England. Forty-five tanks accompanied each Division, of which four-fifths were Fiat-Ansaldo two-men tanks with 2 machine-guns, while 9 larger tanks carried a small cannon as well. Overhead cover was not lacking. At Villarcayo, 20 miles from the front line of Escudo, there was an aerodrome controlled by Italians. The ground staff and the pilots were without exception Italian. Spaniards, in this great Spanish Nationalist Movement, were not encouraged to approach the Villarcayo field, on which were scattered 30 Fiat CR fighting planes, almost twice the number of those at the service of Santander. The bombers, who numbered about 40 and were mostly German, were based on the aerodrome of Gamoral, 3 kilometres out of Burgos. . . . The Santander army was 25,000 strong, and on her left or eastern flank lay the Basque Army . . . another 25,000 men. It would have been possible to find, at most, 200 foreigners among them. If one sets these figures against the 13,000 Spaniards fighting for Franco in the Santander campaign, one can adjust to its right proportions the claim of his movement to be Spanish and National."

Mussolini's newspaper *Il Popolo d'Italia*, of August 29th, 1937, claimed it as an Italian victory, and gave the names of 12 Italian generals who took part and details of the forces involved. So much for "Non-Intervention" then.

Non-Intervention to-day

Time marches on—and so does "Non-Intervention." In November, 1937, Germany and Italy agreed to proportionate withdrawal of their troops, but would not agree as to what would be "substantial withdrawal." Russia suggested 85%; France and Britain thought of 75%; Germany and Italy plumped for 20%; and Franco demanded belligerent rights after the withdrawal of 5,000 men—about 5%! In fact, the whole Committee agreed on only one thing: to disagree and adjourn. Until the Committee can agree on the proportions to be withdrawn, no Commission can be sent to Spain to arrange for withdrawals. And, when the Commission goes, if ever, withdrawals may actually be arranged while Mussolini sends a relieving Expeditionary Force (as foreshadowed). The *Manchester Guardian* estimates a period of 3-6 months between the putting into practice and completion of withdrawals—but there is as yet no sign of agreement about the principles involved!

"Non-Intervention" has helped towards the loss to the Fascists of Britain's life-line—the Mediterranean—and on this subject, Liddell Hart, our most intelligent writer on military subjects, has written: "The danger is so obvious that it is hard to understand the eagerness with which some of the most vocally patriotic sections of the British public desire the rebels' success."

Carlist Manifesto

Last week we published a "Falangist" Manifesto against Franco. This week we publish one of the Carlists, or *Requetés*, those staunch traditionalists and Roman Catholics who gave Franco strong support, who were perhaps his best Spanish

soldiers, and who are now seething with anger and disgust because of the invasion of Spain by foreigners in Franco's "cause." Here is a literal translation: "For God and our Fatherland against invaders of Spain! *REQUETÉS*: With the authority of the blood shed by so many thousands of our brothers, we must look things squarely in the face. Spiritually lost in our struggle for God and Fatherland, we have not taken account of the fact that we are delivering our soil to the foreigner. Our armed forces, our riches, our frontiers and the Institutions of the New State—all are in his hands. His insolence knows no limits and, if this is so now when the war is undecided, what will it be after victory? In a widespread and bloody struggle, we have fought to prevent Marxists and Masons from enslaving the Church of Christ. Shall we now accept that the Church be enslaved by a State modelled by the invader? The publication of the Encyclical (March 14th, 1937) of Our Most Holy Father Pope Pius XI has been forbidden in Catholic Spain. In it His Holiness condemns the theory of the invader of Spain, which aims that the State shall crush the Church of Christ. The terrible persecution of Catholic priests in Germany and their vilification has also been suppressed. The statements of Germany's leaders against the Church have been kept from our people. While they so behave in their own country, the persecutors of Christ are received triumphantly in National Spain, where we hand over to them our wealth, frontiers and even our Administration!"

"Open your eyes *Requetés* and you will see that we are selling Jesus Christ for thirty pieces of silver. When this war is ended, the Spanish Church will groan under a yoke far heavier and more difficult to remove than that which we have attempted to throw off. Thousands of our brothers have died defending the liberty of the Church; so let us not now deliver it over to a pagan and atheistic invader. Let us not lose in one stroke both the Religion and the Fatherland we believe we are defending. The aeroplanes and cannons of various alien powers from both sides devastate our cities, murder priests and nuns, destroy Churches and massacre Spanish women and children often with our aid. For all those aliens, this is merely a trial; and Spain is becoming the battlefield of a new World War. . . ."

"Down with the anti-Catholic invader! Long live the Church of Christ. Out of Spain with the foreigners!"

City Help for Franco

It was reported by the City Editor of the *Daily Herald* (January 29th, 1938) that a sort of private exchange clearing has been established in Franco's interests in the City of London, the effect of which is to enable him to use sterling proceeds of exports from rebel territory for purchasing imported war materials instead of handing them over to British creditors to whom they are owed. Proceeds from exports are paid into a special account, and other British banks and traders to whom Franco owes money cannot obtain it. That is one way of obtaining money. Another method is that by which the Rio Tinto Company hands over to the rebels the sterling proceeds of its exports of Spanish copper and pyrites to Britain, and receives in exchange pesetas at a rate of 42 to the £—which compares with an economic rate of about 75. More than £1,250,000 in sterling is believed to have passed into Franco's hands in this way in the past year, and this has been one of the principal methods by which Franco has financed his imports and the payments to Germany necessary for the war. It is argued that, if Rio Tinto refused to accept this agreement, Franco would refuse to permit further exports. "I am not convinced that he really would," writes the City Editor. "If not, Rio Tinto shareholders may well complain that they are being let down . . . There would be no harm in a little public discussion whether it is in the best interests having of this country, politically or economically. It may be that if Franco were compelled to pay his debts instead of receiving these two supplies of sterling free, he would not be able to carry on the war."

It seems, to say the least, that the interests of many good English men and women are being sacrificed in the interests of their enemies!

Food Problem in Loyal Spain

The food problem in Government Spain has not been an easy one to solve, and for several reasons. The first of these is the obvious one, that, having been cut off from the rest of Spain, it was necessary to improvise services to supply foodstuffs which normally were produced in the Franco zone. The whole of Spain produces such an abundance of food that it can export large quantities, after retaining sufficient for itself. Divided in two, neither the Franco zone nor the Loyalist is completely self-supporting, but Franco has at his side the whole of Portugal from which to buy or to act as a supply line, and therefore has the advantage. Furthermore, he has not had to feed between three and four millions of homeless unfortunates who fled from the Government!—for, whereas about that number fled into

Loyalist territory before Franco's terror, the number of refugees from loyalist Spain is so small that their feeding is no problem at all. These 3-4 million refugees in Government Spain are mostly the old, women and children; and about two-thirds of them are of negligible value from a working point of view. They are, in fact, helpless refugees without anything but what they stand up in; and have to be fed, clothed and sheltered. It is just one extra problem above the hundred others which the Spanish Government has had to face—a problem of essentially a humanitarian nature which is a day-to-day one, and cannot be ignored. In the tragic circumstances, the Loyalists are grateful for any help from abroad, and there are many items—milk, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, cod-liver oil, blankets, woollens, clothes and so forth—which are still required by the refugees from the White Terror.

The general problem of loyalist food supply comes under the following heads: increase in home production, increase in imports, improvement in the general organisation of distribution and, finally, the actual rationing of the military machine and the populace. As in regard to the creation, training and organisation of the Army, the Government started almost from zero. But they started well, and now the food problem has reached a point of rationalisation. Franco's propagandists abroad have been busy spreading the rumour that the population in Government Spain is starving: and that famine conditions prevail everywhere. All such rumours are without the slightest foundation. There is food shortage in Government Spain; there is a complete lack of many foodstuffs on the borderline of luxuries. But there are no more famine conditions in Government Spain than there were in England during the last two years of the World War; and conditions at this moment are infinitely better than they were in Germany in 1918-19. It is always the case under any rationing system that certain people succeed in obtaining more than their due; that others hoard; and that there is profiteering. These are about the only abuses left to be tackled, and this the National Food Council is doing. The rationalisation of the food supply and the general humanitarian social conditions of Government Spain have removed from the landscape those dreadful sights one saw everywhere under the Monarchy: hordes of beggars (especially on Church steps) and the results of economic prostitution. While very few people are now suffering from the diseases of overfeeding, none are starving. As time goes on now, the food question becomes easier—that is, as the new machinery gets into its pace. Agricultural production has increased in almost every district, and is increasing monthly; the purchase of foodstuffs abroad is increasing and becoming easier as the economic position improves and the futility of Franco's attempted "blockade" becomes apparent to foreign shipping (see note below on *War Risks in the Mediterranean*). In fact, most people in Government territory will eat better in 1938 than they did in 1937. There can be no question of famine.

Six Days of Asturias

A Basque refugee, who was in Gijón when Franco's "Saviours of Spain" occupied the town, has gone to Barcelona and made a statement published on January 20th, 1938, as follows:—"We arrived in Gijón at 4 p.m. on a wretched day. The streets were almost deserted. An occasional group or person was slinking about seeking possible safety and trying to pass unnoticed. From time to time one heard a rat-tat-tat or shell explosion, but mostly there was an uneasy quiet. Rebel columns were marching in, and most of us thought only of what our fortune was to be. As the minutes passed, we began to hear voices and the noise of mechanised units. We dispersed separately or with some friend; we went—anywhere: some to the port, where there was not one boat left, or as far as we could get from the invaders. With half-a-dozen friends I went along, passing houses shuttered or barricaded, until we reached a refuge. It was full of people. We could not tell who they were, as we were in absolute darkness. There we were, many of us . . . mostly men from our war units. Each minute was a nightmare. Finally, by six o'clock the enemy had arrived, and the dice thrown. Some of us could not suppress our curiosity, and went to the door or windows—looking. In front of our look-out the first tank went by: Italian. Its occupants did not show themselves, but we heard their shouts and recognised their nationality. They waved Fascist flags from their peep-holes. Then followed more tanks, motor-bicycles, armoured cars—a whole motorised column of Germans and Italians. From time to time one of the occupants got up on top and shouted *Heil Hitler*, which was taken up by the others. The Italians—the officers only—*viva'd* their *Duce*. In that motorised column and the forces which came after there were only Moors and Foreign Legionaries of various *banderas* and they spoke in strange tongues; a Tower of Babel. In the end, and towards night, Civil Guards entered, followed by Navarrese Brigades. We waited, hidden away. We could see isolated persons, a woman or group of children looking on at the "spectacle." Sometimes

a Fascist or Monarchist emblem appeared on a balcony. It was a tragic night. In the refuge there were women and children, some who had been two days there, who had exhausted their food and were beginning to feel hungry and thirsty. The cold penetrated us and we huddled together for warmth. At intervals friends came who had not felt safe in their hiding-places. Now and again we heard fierce bursts of machine-gun fire which caused much weeping amongst us. The mop-up had begun. The first shootings were at 9 o'clock at night. I could not shake off the tension and felt terrified. Death did not matter. I went out into the street, why or where I don't know. Curiosity dominated my feelings, and my first steps were to get news and prepare myself for the worst. I was lucky, for I got a job dealing with cargo and the sorting of material; many others were similarly employed. . . . From the beginning the invaders occupied places which had been our barracks. It was the Civil Guard which began the terror. During the whole night they cast their net and groups of them butchered the population, without selection or even a glance for identities. A great number of their catches were in the refuges, where those who had no other place to go took cover—the majority. During the day they were relieved by patrols of the Fascist *Falange* and *Requetés*. It went on without a stop. At one refuge they acted tragically. At the entrance, in the darkness, they placed a machine-gun, which functioned until not one person was left standing. During the six days in which I remained in Gijón, the massacres continued. They brought about 6,000 prisoners to the Bull Ring, and selected from them small groups, which returned no more. . . . Next day again the slaughter continued; and by night it was terrible."

"In those first days," the witness continues, "life at Gijón was an orgy: Moors, Foreign Legion and the foreigners gave themselves over to libertinage. They sang songs and went into a drunken debauch. Not a house but was desecrated, not a home but was sacked, not an establishment but was ravaged. The ravaging and rapine reached a stage of ferocity. It was the reward offered: the spoils."

Money and Fiscal Policy

While the Franco *junta* have shown great consistency in preventing payment to Spain's British creditors, and in defrauding British companies operating in rebel territory, by compelling them to surrender sterling proceeds of their exports at the exchange rate of about 45, the Government have been equally consistent in pursuing a policy of endeavouring to meet all Spain's obligations. The *Financial News* has commented on this subject as follows: "There is naturally enough a tendency among bankers in London and other centres to feel that the foreign creditors of Spain stand a better chance of being repaid in the case of a victory for the Government than in the case of a victory for General Franco." It should be noted that "The Nationalists" claim to stand for national honour and decency. Those who are interested in the "Financial Relations between the Spanish Government and Great Britain" may obtain a pamphlet under that title from The Friends of Spain, 11A, Hart Street, London, W.C.1. It is not a piece of special pleading, but merely a reprint of three articles from that very respectable newspaper *The Financial News*. The price is 3d., including postage, and it is worth its weight in gold. Internally, Government Spain knows how to order her affairs well in matters of finance and fiscal policy. They have reduced the National Debt by about one-fifth—and that in time of war. When Treasury Bonds first matured under the present Government, on October 23rd, 1937, holders had the choice between repayment and exchange of the old certificates for those of a new loan. Of 290 million pesetas, repayment was asked for two million, which was satisfied; and a subscription to cover the necessary amount was immediately realised.

The war has not caused great changes in the fiscal system. War profits are taxed, there are some extra taxes on commercial undertakings, etc. The results have shown an increase in fiscal revenue every month since last May. The Prime Minister, Señor Negrín, said on November 27th last: "Our economic position would allow us to carry on the war for another two years."

This, then, is the financial position of a Government that was attacked suddenly and in the position of having to re-organise the administrative system from top to bottom, and deal with three million refugees who had fled before the Franco terror. It is a striking tribute to efficiency. Happily, there is an orange crop of high quality and of 650,000 metric tons. The export demand is for 500,000 tons.

War Risks in the Mediterranean

On January 21st, the Joint War Risk Rating Committee of Lloyds Underwriters decided to make big reductions in the rates for insuring against war risks in the Mediterranean: from

5s. to 2s. 6d. per cent.; and for cargo in tankers from 12s. 6d. to 5s. These figures are eloquent, showing that notwithstanding the increased rebel activity in the air, the sea routes are comparatively safe. The reductions are the result of a comparatively long period during which few war risk losses have been reported.

The Republican Army

The new army of the Republic now numbers 650,000 men with 140,000 in reserve. The International Brigade totals less than 15,000. An Army of Spaniards faces the "Nationalists."

The Man who believed in Franco


Señor Gonzálbez Ruíz is a lawyer from Alicante, whom the former Prime Minister Portela Valladares made Governor of Murcia. When the military rebellion surprised him in his own town, he fled to Gibraltar—believing that the movement would quickly end. There he was informed by a Franco agent that he would be safe at Seville: so, taking his courage in both hands, he set out. At La Linea he was arrested, put in prison, freed; and then re-arrested. He was in and out of prison several times, with no charge against him; and at last decided to escape. He had believed in Franco, but got weary of this treatment and at last succeeded in escaping. Now he has published a book—another of those "Documents of the War" that are invaluable because they are accounts by completely reliable eye-witnesses. The title is "*Yo he creído en Franco*"—"I believed in Franco," and it has already appeared in French and Spanish. It must be translated. Parts of it are too horrible to be quoted here, but a moderate section may be cited as an example of life in the Franco zone. He describes the practices in the Seville prison, and gives a vivid pen-picture of the drunken Governor who signs the daily list of death warrants. At dawn the jail doors open to disgorge on lorries the daily selection of condemned. They are taken and shot—there is no delay. He gives the names and particulars of the executioners, one of whom is the son of a nobleman's estate manager. From one district with a population of 12,000 there have been executed 3,000. The executions continue.

Books

The books and pamphlets published in English on the subject of the Civil War make an imposing list, but few of them are of solid value because of the lack of knowledge of the background on the part of most writers who have attempted the subject. To write of this Civil War, one should know Spain and Spaniards—and Spanish, at least. Borkenau's *Spanish Cockpit* (Faber, 10s. 6d.) can be recommended, and the recently published *Spanish Testament*, by Arthur Koestler (Gollancz, 10s. 6d.). About the Basques there is nothing to equal *The Tree of Gernika*, by George Steer (Hodder & Stoughton, 12s. 6d.), and it is difficult to see how it could be improved upon. Koestler's book stands in a class by itself. It is the work of a well-informed journalist of liberal opinion who reported the Civil War from the beginning, on Franco's side and the Government's, and who was in Málaga when it was taken for Franco by the first Italian Expeditionary Force. Koestler was imprisoned by Franco, condemned to death, reprieved after a world-wide outcry and set free. This book is a summing up of his study and observation, and four-fifths of it are based on first-hand evidence. The first part is a retrospect of history, the second a "Dialogue with Death," describing his prison experiences. Most of the first part will be known to students of the Spanish situation, though he has some interesting facts and commentary about Franco's propaganda and the Alcázar. The second, and most interesting part, will probably take its place amongst remembered prison literature. Koestler is obviously an intelligent and sensitive man who was appalled by all he had seen of Franco's movement and its implications for civilization. With it must be read *My House in Málaga*, by Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell, to be published by Faber's on February 9th. We shall review this book later and content ourselves now by stating that it is a document of the greatest interest for an understanding of the psychological background, written by a distinguished Englishman who had retired to Málaga to have peace and found—well, you must read the book.

Franco's Predecessors

In view of the recent massacres of civilians by Franco's alien aerial assassins, it is interesting to recall that his predecessors behaved similarly. The horrors perpetrated by the reactionary Carlists disturbed public opinion in England last century no less than the rebels' massacres of innocents do now. To-day private charity has done much, in the limited way open to it, to mitigate suffering in Spain. But during the Carlist War it was the British Government itself which officially intervened.



THE "NATIONALISTS."

Don Carlos was in the habit of executing all his prisoners immediately after capture. England sent a special envoy, Lord Eliot, to Spain, who succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the Carlists to a convention putting an end to this practice. The Eliot Convention (July 27th, 1835) remained in force throughout the war, but other atrocities continued. There may be something in the psychology of rebellion which demands a show of power in the form of extreme violence. Whatever the cause, unnecessary killing in both Spanish civil wars has been largely the work of rebels. Lord Palmerston did not hesitate to say of General Cabrera, one of the leading Carlist commanders, that—"... by the unparalleled atrocities which he has perpetrated, he casts a stain not merely upon the party to which he belongs and the country which gave him birth, but upon the age in which he lives."

In the hope of putting a stop to Carlist atrocities, Lord Palmerston protested to the Holy Alliance powers, asking them to exert what influence they could upon their protégé. Writing to the British Ambassadors in Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg, he enclosed despatches describing the atrocities and instructed the Ambassadors to—"... draw the serious attention of the Government to which you are accredited to the melancholy and afflicting details which these papers contain. . . ."

"Now it is well known that the cause of Don Carlos derives great assistance from the moral support of the Prussian [Austrian, Russian] Government, and it cannot be doubted that a salutary effect would be produced upon the Prince by the knowledge of the indignant disgust with which the atrocities perpetrated by his commanders must necessarily inspire the Cabinet of Berlin [Vienna, St. Petersburg]." (November 27th, 1838.)

Concerning the question of which side was the more culpable, the word of the man who was British Ambassador in Spain throughout all but the last few months of the war may be taken as authoritative. In a debate in the House of Lords Lord Clarendon said: "I am bound in justice to say that the Spanish Government . . . manifested a desire (of which they omitted no occasion to prove the sincerity) that the war should be carried on according to the usages of civilised nations. And here, My Lords, I must beg, in answer to the unwarranted remarks of the noble Marquess [Lord Londonderry, who had said that the Government soldiers were as guilty as the Carlists] that it is most hard, it is most unjust, to confound such men and their intentions and their acts with the soldiers of Don Carlos. . . . The outrage is deeply felt by them, and they cannot but be indignant that such opinions should be current in England and more particularly among the foreign powers and their representatives at the different courts of Europe, who have doubtless their own good purposes to serve in representing the two parties now contending in Spain as . . . rivals in barbarity." (July 23rd, 1839.)